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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECT OF ETFS ON STOCK LIQUIDITY 
Sophia Jihae Wee Hamm 
Wayne R. Guay (Supervisor of Dissertation) 
This paper investigates the effect of the introduction of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) on 
the liquidity of individual stocks. Prior analytical studies suggest that uninformed 
investors strictly prefer trading ETFs to trading individual stocks in order to avoid trading 
against informed investors. As a result of uninformed investors’ migration, the markets 
for individual stocks are predicted to become illiquid as ETFs become widely available. 
Using ETF trading and holdings data between 2002 and 2008, I test the hypothesis that 
the higher the percentage of a firm’s shares held by ETFs, the higher the adverse 
selection cost to trade the firm’s stock. I find that the availability of ETFs as an 
alternative trading option is positively associated with the adverse selection component of 
bid-ask spreads of stocks in ETFs. The positive association is shown to be stronger with 
ETFs holding more diversified portfolios of stocks, as uninformed investors’ incentives 
to switch are stronger for more diversified ETFs. The increase in the adverse selection 
costs of individual stocks is transferred to the ETF-level adverse selection costs, and 
diversified ETFs are especially shown to suffer from illiquidity of their underlying 
stocks. This dynamics between stock-level and ETF-level adverse selection casts a doubt 
whether uninformed investors can avoid the adverse selection cost by trading ETFs as 
effectively as expected. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines how the introduction of tradable baskets of stocks affects 
uninformed traders’ incentives and adverse selection costs of trading individual stocks. 
The term “adverse selection” in this paper refers to the lambda (λ) in the Kyle [1985] 
model of the price formation process. Specifically, the lambda represents the illiquidity of 
a market for a security, and it determines how severely information asymmetry affects a 
security’s price.  
Kyle [1985] develops a model in which informed investors take advantage of 
uninformed investors and profit from trading on private information about the value of an 
asset. Subrahmanyam [1991] extends the model to a multi-asset economy setting where 
baskets of stocks are available for trading. Because private information about individual 
assets plays a smaller role at a portfolio level, the informational disadvantage assessed by 
a market maker is smaller in the market for baskets of stocks, leading to a lower adverse 
selection cost.1
                                                 
1  Empirical studies including Clarke and Shastri [2001], Hedge and McDermott [2004a], Berkman, 
Brailsford, and Frino [2005], and Frino, Kruk, and Lepone [2007] find that the adverse selection cost is 
smaller at a portfolio level. 
 Therefore, uninformed traders should prefer trading baskets of stocks. 
Zingales [2009] goes so far as to argue that regulation prohibiting individual investors 
from investing in individual stocks and encouraging them to invest only in exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) or mutual funds could function as the ultimate protection of 
uninformed investors. Even in the absence of this suggested regulation, however, 
uninformed investors who acknowledge the informational disadvantage of trading 
individual stocks are expected to switch to trading ETFs or mutual funds. The recent 
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popularity of ETFs and index funds seems to corroborate this benefit to uninformed 
investors. 
A key implication of Kyle [1985] is that the existence of uninformed investors in 
the market for an individual stock is an important determinant of the adverse selection 
cost in the price formation process. Specifically, the fewer uninformed investors that 
participate in trading, the less liquid the market becomes. To test this prediction, I 
examine whether the adverse selection problem at the individual stock level becomes 
exacerbated as ETFs are introduced, and uninformed investors trade ETFs instead of 
individual stocks. An ETF provides an ideal setting to test the shift of incentives of 
uninformed investors because ETFs come with fewer of the shortcomings of mutual 
funds, such as minimum investment restrictions, high fees, agency costs, and inefficiency 
in trading cost distribution.2
Using 152,151 firm-quarter observations of 8,420 firms between 2002 and 2008, I 
find a positive association between the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads of 
a stock and the percentage of a firm’s shares held by ETFs, implying that the adverse 
selection cost increases as the market for an individual stock is deprived of noise trades 
due to ETFs. The association between the change in the adverse selection cost and the 
 I use the percentage of a firm’s shares held by ETFs as a 
proxy for alternative investment opportunities for uninformed investors, and hypothesize 
that the adverse selection cost of trading the stock increases with this measure.  
                                                 
2 Among mutual funds, index mutual funds are the closest alternatives to ETFs with their low expense 
ratios and passive trading strategies. In supplemental analysis, I examine whether the percentage of shares 
held by index mutual funds has similar effects on adverse selection of individual stocks. I also examine 
shares held and traded by actively managed mutual funds, and find that these funds do not influence 
adverse selection costs at the individual stock level, suggesting that active mutual funds are viewed by the 
markets as informed institutional ownership. 
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change in the percentage of shares held by ETFs during the periods of introduction of 
new ETFs is also significant and positive. These results highlight the redistribution 
among investors of costs and benefits associated with discouraging uninformed investors 
from trading individual stocks in order to protect them against informed investors. I 
further show that ETFs composed of these individual stocks with increased adverse 
selection costs yield lower effectiveness in diversifying individual stocks’ adverse 
selection costs, which partially negates the benefit of switching to ETFs.  
Subrahmanyam [1991] identifies conditions under which uninformed traders 
prefer trading baskets of stocks. These conditions are closely related to the degree of 
diversification of these baskets of stocks. The more diversified a basket of stocks is, the 
more attractive it is to uninformed investors. Therefore, the market for an individual 
stock becomes more illiquid if a newly introduced basket holds a more diversified 
portfolio.3
I further test the implicit assumption used in the previous test: whether a portfolio 
with a higher degree of diversification is more likely to exhibit lower adverse selection 
costs. An ETF benefits from enhanced liquidity as liquidity is taken away from individual 
stocks the ETF holds, and this liquidity shift is predicted to be stronger for more 
diversified ETFs. Also, lambdas of individual stocks are more efficiently diversified 
 I find modest evidence that the positive association between the increase in the 
adverse selection cost and the increase in the percentage of shares held by ETFs is 
stronger when these ETFs duplicate diversified broad market indexes (as opposed to 
when they duplicate sector indexes). 
                                                 
3 In this paper, I often compare individual stocks and ETFs. I use the terms “individual stocks” or 
“underlying stocks” to refer to stocks held by ETFs, not individual stocks in general. 
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away if an ETF holds a diversified portfolio. Therefore, more diversified ETFs are 
expected to exhibit lower lambdas than less diversified ETFs. At the same time, however, 
as the liquidity shift is stronger for the more diversified ETFs, stocks held by these ETFs 
suffer higher illiquidity than stocks held by less diversified ETFs. Therefore, more 
diversified ETFs are expected to exhibit higher lambdas than less diversified ETFs. In 
summary, the sign of the association between diversification and portfolio-level adverse 
selection is an empirical issue given the inflow of uninformed investors to ETF trades. 
I find that, ceteris paribus, ETF adverse selection costs decrease in the degree of 
diversification, as predicted by portfolio theory (Markowitz [1952]) and by the liquidity 
effect of the inflow of uninformed investors who prefer more diversified ETFs.4
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the 
institutional background of ETFs, discusses relevant literature, and develops hypotheses. 
Section 3 explains variable measurements and describes the sample. Section 4 provides 
 However, 
I also find that the association between an ETF lambda and lambdas of individual stocks 
is stronger for more diversified ETFs. This result contradicts portfolio theory, but 
confirms that the undiversified portion of adverse selection costs of stocks in more 
diversified ETFs is larger than expected, presumably due to the deprivation of noise 
trades in the market of individual stocks. 
                                                 
4 The classic portfolio theory about diversification of idiosyncratic risks (Markowitz [1952]) predicts that 
the portfolio-level risk relative to the collective asset-level risks is lower when a portfolio is more 
diversified. However, this prediction is less obvious when the formation of the portfolio itself causes 
uninformed investors to migrate to the portfolio (e.g., an ETF). I predict that this migration increases 
individual stocks’ adverse selection and further increases the lambda of ETFs composed of these individual 
stocks. 
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empirical test designs and presents the main test results. Section 6 provides additional 
tests and results. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Institutional background on ETFs 
In this section, I summarize institutional details related to ETFs, and explain why 
these investment portfolios are appropriate for testing hypotheses related to how trading 
behavior of uninformed investors influences adverse selection trading costs.  ETFs have 
grown exponentially since the first ETF (SPDR S&P500:SPY) was introduced in 1993. 
By the end of 2008, 728 ETFs were traded on NYSE and AMEX. The sample used in this 
paper includes 133 sector ETFs and 140 diversified ETFs holding U.S. equities between 
2002 and 2008. The total market value of these ETFs was approximately $99 billion in 
the first quarter of 2002. By the end of 2008, the total market value grew five times, and 
the market value of the oldest and the largest ETF (SPY) was approximately $83 billion. 
In 2008, the numbers of sector ETFs and diversified ETFs were similar, but the average 
of sector ETFs’ market values was only 13% of the average of diversified ETFs’ market 
values.  
A comparison of ETFs with other types of funds highlights several distinct 
characteristics of ETFs. There are three legal forms of investment companies: mutual 
funds (open-end companies), closed-end companies, and unit investment trusts (UITs). 
ETFs are legally classified as open-end companies or UITs. Nevertheless, ETFs are 
neither exactly open-end funds nor UITs. Regardless of their legal classification, ETFs 
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share certain characteristics of all three forms of investment companies. First, ETFs are 
traded in the secondary market, which is a feature of closed-end companies and UITs. 
Second, as with mutual funds, investors of ETFs buy and sell shares from management 
companies of funds. A fundamental difference between mutual funds and ETFs in this 
buying and selling process stems from the fact that ETF shares are created by 
management companies and sold in a block to authorized parties (market makers, 
specialist, and arbitrageurs). These authorized parties resell these ETF shares in the 
secondary markets to retail investors, whereas retail investors of mutual funds directly 
buy and sell from management companies. In addition, when purchasing and redeeming 
ETF shares from the ETF management companies, the authorized parties pay and receive 
in the form of a basket of stocks instead of cash. If there is any discrepancy between 
NAV and the market price of ETF shares at the market closing, the authorized parties can 
profit from it. If NAV is lower (higher) than the market price of an ETF, the authorized 
parties deposit (receive) the basket of stocks and receive (deposit) the ETF shares from 
the fund. This process is called the “creation (redemption) in-kind.”5 Therefore, ETFs can 
own between 0% and 100% of a given stock, unlike index futures and options that do not 
affect the supply of stock shares traded in the open market.6
ETFs have several advantages over mutual funds that are attractive to uniformed 
investors (where one can think about uniformed investors as individuals that are focused 
  
                                                 
5 However, the arbitrage profit is not the main motivation for the authorized parties to create and redeem 
ETF shares, nor is the profit meaningfully large (Gastineau [2002]). Market makers adjust ETF inventories 
mainly due to the demand and supply of ETF shares in the secondary markets. 
6 This characteristic fits the pricing models where the supply of securities is not infinite. The supply of 
ETFs is limited and affects the supply of underlying stocks, whereas the supply of other derivatives such as 
index futures can be infinite. By the same token, I exclude short ETFs and ultra ETFs that use derivatives 
as underlying assets. 
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typically on investing their savings in low-cost, well-diversified portfolios). First, ETFs 
offer lower transaction costs. The annual expense ratios of ETFs are significantly lower 
than those of U.S. equity mutual funds, in part because they have no shareholder 
accounting.7 In 2008, the average expense ratio was 0.55% (median 0.55%) for domestic 
equity ETFs, 1.05% (median 0.94%) for index mutual funds, and 1.41% (median 1.32%) 
for actively managed domestic equity mutual funds.89 According to the 2009 investment 
company fact book by the investment company institute (ICI factbook [2009]), there is a 
clear trend of investors’ preference to lower expense mutual funds. More than 100% of 
the new cash inflow has been to mutual funds with below-average expense ratios while 
mutual funds with above-average expense ratios have experienced cash outflows. 
Investors’ distaste toward a high expense ratio partially explains the popularity of ETFs 
and index mutual funds. In addition, ETFs are neither front-loaded nor end-loaded, do not 
require a minimum investment amount, which is $3,000 (median) for major index mutual 
funds offered to individuals.10
Second, the prices of ETFs track their NAVs efficiently, and investors can freely 
buy or sell them intra-day at the market price. Even though closed-end funds are also 
  
                                                 
7 Mutual fund investors pay fees (12b-1 fees) to cover ongoing expenses in addition to one-time sales loads, 
and more than 50% of these fees are used for shareholder services including shareholder accounting. 
Purchases and redemptions of mutual fund shares by investors incur purchases and sales of stocks in 
markets; these are considered to be transactions that require book-keeping, and fund accounting agents 
validate daily transactions (ICI factbook [2009]). 
8 These figures are from “Fund index recap” (May, 2009) by Lipper (www.lipperweb.com). 
9 In terms of expense ratio, index mutual funds and ETFs are comparable. As the large index mutual funds 
are the ones that offer notably lower expense ratios, the value-weighted average expense ratio of index 
mutual funds (0.23%) is smaller than that of ETFs (0.31%). 
10 The minimum initial investment requirement for the 29 largest U.S. equity index mutual funds ranges 
from $0 to $1 million with a median value of $3,000 and an average value of $92,000 (as of Oct. 2009, 
www.morningstar.com). The average minimum investment required for purchasing the 8 largest index 
mutual funds offered to institutions is $53 million. The majority of these large index mutual funds belong 
to the Vanguard fund family.  
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tradable intra-day, their market prices exhibit substantial deviations from NAV (“closed-
end fund puzzle”).11
Third, trading costs of ETFs are more efficiently distributed among investors. 
Trading costs, including brokerage commissions, bid-ask spreads, and liquidity risk, are 
considered to be an additional fee ETF investors need to pay over and above the 
traditional mutual fund expenses. This notion stems from the fact that the investors 
themselves trade ETF shares in secondary markets, and presumably they do so more 
frequently than they do mutual funds. Gastineau [2002] notes that, contrary to this 
common belief that the trading costs are the disadvantage of ETFs, the trading costs (paid 
by those who actually trade) are the advantage of ETFs over mutual funds. It is well 
documented that long-term investors in mutual funds subsidize trading costs incurred by 
investors who frequently trade (Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm [2000], Christoffersen, Keim, 
and Musto [2007], and Guedj and Huang [2008]). This is because whenever mutual fund 
shares are created or redeemed at the market closing prices due to these frequent traders, 
 In contrast, the trading prices of ETFs approximate NAV most of the 
time, thanks in part to the expected daily arbitrage activity of the authorized parties after 
the close. Pontiff [1996, 2006] and Ackert and Tian [2000] conclude that ETFs exhibit 
lower deviations from NAVs; these papers attribute it to the lower arbitrage costs, as the 
holdings of ETFs are well disclosed to investors. In fact, all ETFs in the sample duplicate 
indexes whose market values are posted frequently during the trading hours. According 
to Ackert and Tian [2000], the discrepancy between the market price and NAV never 
exceeded 1% for the earlier ETFs (S&P500 SPDRs and MidCap SPDRs). 
                                                 
11 Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler [1991] note that the norm is 10 to 20 percent discount from NAV and seek 
explanations from investor irrationality. Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton [2009] attribute the discount to 
illiquidity of closed-end fund shares. 
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the adverse effect on the stock price due to mutual fund managers’ activities of buying 
and selling underlying stocks only affects the remaining investors. The trading cost 
structure of ETFs forces frequent traders to bear their own trading costs, and therefore 
buy-and-hold investors are better off with ETFs than with mutual funds. The transaction 
costs that frequent traders of ETFs incur are not especially high, whereas trading mutual 
funds is usually subject to higher brokerage fees and wider spreads. This is because 
trading ETFs is considered to be the same as trading stocks, and the trading-cost feature 
innate in the bid-ask spreads is common to any assets traded intra-day. In addition, the 
trading cost of buying a basket of stocks as one security is considerably lower than the 
trading cost of buying the actual portfolio of stocks.12
In summary, ETFs offer uninformed investors several advantages over mutual 
funds with no obvious additional costs. ETFs’ fees are significantly lower than mutual 
fund management fees, ETFs track their underlying stocks’ net asset values more 
efficiently, and the trading costs are more efficiently distributed among investors based 
on the frequency of trades.  
  
 
2.2 Adverse selection and market microstructure studies 
This paper investigates whether the introduction of tradable baskets of stocks via 
ETFs has an impact on the adverse selection costs of individual assets as suggested by 
prior theories, using both firm-level and portfolio-level characteristics. In this section, I 
                                                 
12 Bid-ask spreads of ETFs have the same characteristics as bid-ask spreads of stocks, and therefore I 
calculate the adverse selection component of ETF bid-ask spreads in the same way as I calculate the 
adverse selection component of stock bid-ask spreads. 
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review literature on the adverse selection costs of assets in general and theories to 
develop the hypothesis.  
The market microstructure literature focuses on the price formation process 
through intra-day trading mechanisms. The main players in this price formation process 
are the (uninformed) market maker, informed traders, uninformed traders and noise 
traders. The market maker reacts to order flows submitted by these traders by adjusting 
bid-ask spreads. When adjusting bid-ask spreads, the market maker takes into 
consideration both his inventory and the expected informational advantage of informed 
traders.  
The earlier stream of analytical studies emphasizes the inventory adjustment 
concern of the market maker (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson [1980] and Madhavan and 
Smidt [1993]). The focus of study was moved to information asymmetry in the price 
formation process by Glosten and Milgrom [1985] and Easley and O’Hara [1987]. Kyle 
[1985] presents a model of how private information is incorporated into trading processes 
when the market maker sets a price to clear orders, where the price anticipates the 
behavior of an informed trader. A number of studies extend the Kyle [1985] model with 
variations in the model specification.13
                                                 
13 Among others, Admati and Pfleiderer [1988], Holden and Subrahmanyam [1992], and Spiegel and 
Subrahmanyam [1992] extend Kyle [1985] by relaxing the condition of one informed investor or the 
condition of one uninformed trader. Verrecchia [2001] adds the precision of public disclosure as an 
additional parameter. 
 The notion of adverse selection used in this paper 
is lambda (λ) as defined in the Kyle [1985] model. All the predictions in this paper are 
based on characteristics of lambda, such as the likelihood of informed trades and the 
uncertainty associated with an asset’s value. 
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Later studies examine both the inventory concern and information asymmetry in 
the price formation process, and focus on the decomposition of a bid-ask spread into 
multiple components.14
 Empirical studies that test predictions directly or indirectly derived from 
Subrahmanyam [1991] are not unprecedented. Most of these studies use index futures as 
the appropriate proxy for baskets of stocks, and investigate the difference in liquidity and 
adverse selection between underlying stocks of indexes and the index futures. Some 
attribute the cash-future basis to the difference in liquidity and adverse selection. 
Berkman, Brailsford, and Frino [2005] finds that adverse selection costs are lower for 
 However, most of these analyses are limited to an analysis of an 
individual security. A few exceptions that incorporate the notion of diversification into 
the price formation process model include Gammill and Perold [1989], which attributes 
the success of index futures to the advantage of higher liquidity at a portfolio level, and 
Subrahmanyam [1991], which extends the Kyle [1985] model to the trading process of a 
tradable basket of stocks and presents conditions in which informed traders and 
uninformed traders choose between trading individual stocks and trading a basket of 
stocks. The analytical study by Gorton and Pennacchi [1993] provides a setting where the 
introduction of a security based on minimum-variance composites eliminates all liquidity 
trades at an individual stock level. The main hypothesis of this paper is based on these 
studies. I hypothesize that the introduction of tradable baskets of stocks has an impact on 
the adverse selection costs of individual assets, and test the hypothesis using ETF data. 
                                                 
14 Lee and Ready [1991] suggests a method to determine whether a trading is driven by buy or sell order 
flows. Hasbrouck [1991], Foster and Viswanathan [1993], Lin, Sanger, and Booth [1995], Huang and Stoll 
[1997], Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans [1997], Glosten and Harris [1998], and Stoll [2000] present 
modifications of analytical methods to decompose bid-ask spreads. 
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index futures than they are for underlying stocks, using the FTSE100 stock index futures 
contract and its underlying stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange. Frino, Kruk, 
and Lepone [2007] finds that, in Australian markets, futures trades are uninformed, 
implying low adverse selection in futures trading. Roll, Schwartz and Subrahmanyam 
[2007] empirically finds a positive association between the cash-future basis of NYSE 
composite index futures and liquidity costs of stocks on NYSE proxied by bid-ask 
spreads. This study focuses on the lead and lag relation between the basis and bid-ask 
spreads. As the most direct test of Subrahmanyam [1991] among studies using index 
futures, Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam [1993] shows an increase in bid-ask spreads of 
S&P 500 stocks after the introduction of the S&P 500 futures. However, the evidence is 
largely descriptive and based on a small sample. 
Some studies use tradable funds, such as ETFs or closed-end funds, to analyze 
portfolio-level adverse selection. Hasbrouck [2003] examines the intraday data of ETFs 
and futures of three indexes (S&P 500, S&P 400, and Nasdaq 100), but the focus is on 
whether trades of these ETFs convey information that leads the price of index futures and 
vice versa. Clarke and Shastri [2001] finds that adverse selection for closed-end funds is 
lower than the weighted average of the adverse selection costs of underlying stocks. 
Hedge and McDermott [2004a] predicts that individual stocks become illiquid as ETFs 
become available. However, as a testable hypothesis for this prediction, the study tests 
whether the liquidity costs of ETFs are in general lower than liquidity costs of individual 
stocks, instead of directly testing the effect of ETFs on underlying stocks’ liquidity. The 
study finds that the liquidity costs of two ETFs, DIA and Q’s, are lower than their 
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component stocks’ liquidity costs and attribute the difference to lower adverse selection 
at an ETF level. Neal and Wheatley [1998] investigates the adverse selection components 
of the bid-ask spreads of 17 closed-end mutual funds. The study implicitly assumes that 
information asymmetry at the fund level should not exist as long as the net asset value of 
the underlying portfolio is frequently disclosed. Therefore, the observed adverse selection 
cost is attributed to mispricing, fund expense, and volume. These predictions, however, 
are not empirically confirmed. These prior studies that investigate ETFs’ adverse 
selection costs do not directly address nor test the effect of ETFs on individual assets’ 
adverse selection costs. This paper provides cross-sectional tests using a comprehensive 
sample of U.S. equity ETFs supplemented by the sample of U.S. equity mutual funds. 
The main purpose of this paper is to directly examine the effect of tradable baskets of 
stocks on the adverse selection costs of individual stocks. 
In summary, this paper contributes to the existing studies in two aspects: it uses 
ETF data as the most suitable setting for testing adverse selection hypotheses derived 
from Subrahmanyam [1991], and it provides a direct test of the effect of a tradable 
baskets of stocks on the underlying stocks’ adverse selection costs. In the next section, I 
provide hypotheses based on Subrahmanyam [1991]’s predictions, combined with the 
classical portfolio theory by Markowitz [1952] and the price formation process model by 
Kyle [1985].  
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2.3 Hypotheses development 
I adopt two of Subrahmanyam [1991]’s predictions in this paper: (1) The benefit 
to uninformed investors from trading a basket of stocks instead of individual stocks 
increases as the basket becomes more diversified; and (2) The introduction of a tradable 
basket of stocks affects the demographics of investors, and therefore affects the liquidity 
of markets for these stocks. Based on these predictions, I develop a hypothesis that the 
introduction of a tradable basket of stocks makes the underlying securities less liquid, and 
that the more diversified the basket, the stronger this liquidity effect. 
Subrahmanyam [1991] analytically demonstrates that when informed and 
uninformed investors have discretion over choosing between trading a pre-weighted 
basket of stocks as a single security versus individually trading the exact same 
composition of stocks, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which uninformed investors 
prefer to trade the basket security. As discussed below, there are fewer informed 
investors at a portfolio level. Therefore, uninformed investors prefer trading baskets 
because the adverse selection cost is smaller at a portfolio level than at an individual 
stock level.15
Informed investors’ preferences are also important, as their preferences affect 
uninformed investors’ decisions as to the kinds of tradable baskets to which they migrate. 
As it relates to these baskets, however, informed investors’ preferences are less obvious 
than uninformed investors’. Investors who are privately informed about the idiosyncratic 
component of individual stocks (“security-specific informed investors”) prefer to trade 
  
                                                 
15 Easley, Engle, O’Hara, and Wu [2008] finds that the arrival rate of uninformed investors is negatively 
associated with the arrival rate of informed traders in the past. 
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individual stocks versus a pre-weighted basket of stocks. This preference is stronger 
when the basket of stocks is well-diversified and has a larger number of stocks. 
Even though informed investors are, as described above, reluctant to trade baskets 
of stocks due to their loss of informational advantage, trading baskets proffers the benefit 
of both greater diversification of idiosyncratic risks and more liquidity. Therefore, some 
informed traders may reshuffle their resources and opt to acquire private information 
about the systematic component of a basket of stocks, instead of private information 
about security-specific components of the underlying stocks. An informed trader who 
gathers private information about the systematic component (“factor-informed investor”) 
is better off trading a basket of stocks than trading individual stocks. Subrahmanyam 
[1991] predicts that a well-diversified basket of stocks attracts fewer security-specific 
informed traders, and more factor-informed traders. This prediction, however, needs to be 
interpreted cautiously. Consider two tradable baskets of stocks: a broader market index 
fund and a sector fund. The price of the former is largely determined by market risk 
because its idiosyncratic components are diversified away. The sector fund’s price is also 
determined by market risk, but a sector fund diversifies away less idiosyncratic risk. For 
an investor who is informed about the market-wide systematic component, it is more 
profitable to trade a broader market index fund than a sector fund. Moreover, because 
security-specific informed investors are less likely to trade a broader-market index fund 
than a sector fund, there is less competition among informed traders. Therefore, 
conditional on an investor’s possession of private information about a market-wide 
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component, a broader market index fund is more attractive to the investor than a sector 
fund. 
If we consider the costs and benefits for investors to acquire private information 
about a systematic factor, however, a sector fund can be a more attractive option. An 
informed investor who acquires private information about a certain industry can also be 
described as a factor-informed investor in the sense that the macro variable is a 
systematic factor of the industry. I predict that it is less costly for a security-specific 
informed investor to be a factor-informed investor of the industry to which the security 
belongs than to be a factor-informed investor of the market portfolio. Therefore, I predict 
that the likelihood of informed trade is higher for sector funds than for diversified, 
broader market index funds. 
In summary, when a basket of stocks becomes available for trading, uninformed 
investors prefer trading the basket of stocks to trading an individual stock. I predict this 
migration of uninformed investors causes the adverse selection components of stock bid-
ask spreads to increase. Security-specific informed traders choose to either continue to 
trade individual stocks or reallocate resources to acquire private information about the 
systematic component of the basket of stocks and trade the basket. The more diversified 
the newly available basket of stocks, the more likely the security-specific investors will 
continue to trade individual stocks. When they decide to become factor-specific informed 
traders, it is easier for informed traders to switch to trading sector funds than to trading 
well-diversified funds. As a result, uninformed traders assess the likelihood of informed 
trades to be smaller in trading diversified funds than in trading sector funds, and therefore 
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are more likely to seek out diversified funds. This leads to a greater increase in adverse 
selection for stocks held by diversified portfolios than for stocks held by sector portfolios. 
These predictions lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The introduction of a basket of stocks makes the adverse selection 
problem of underlying stocks more severe. As a result, a stock with a higher percentage 
of shares traded as part of a basket of stocks exhibits greater adverse selection. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The increase in adverse selection is more pronounced when a 
basket of stocks is a diversified portfolio rather than a sector portfolio. 
 
Uninformed investors’ inclination toward more diversified portfolios can be 
explained in the context of the traditional portfolio theory (Markowitz [1952]).  First, 
note that Kyle [1995]’s notion of adverse selection (λ) is a function of the number of 
informed investors (N), the precision of cash flow conditional on public information 
(h+n), and the precision of noise trading (t) as the following (Appendix A.1): 
nhN
Nt
++
=
1
1
λ      (1) 
There are distinct trading markets, investor groups, and market makers for ETFs, and an 
ETF’s closing price is not automatically the net asset value of the portfolio it holds. 
Therefore, an ETF’s adverse selection is not exactly the weighted average of λs of the 
stocks held by the ETF. The theoretical value of an ETF’s adverse selection is close to 
the portfolio-level adverse selection cost calculated as if the portfolio is a single security. 
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Appendix A.2 shows that portfolio-level adverse selection (λpf) can be approximated as 
follows: 16
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,     (2) 
where pfN is the number of informed traders trading the portfolio, pft is the precision of 
noise trading, e is a J x 1 vector of scalar ones and V is the J x J covariance matrix of 
values of J stocks in the portfolio, conditional on the public disclosure quality.  
It is analytically straightforward to show that pfλ is determined by three factors: 
the likelihood of informed trades determined by pfN  and pft , the diversification benefit 
determined by the off-diagonal elements of V, and the base-line uncertainty of underlying  
stocks determined by the diagonal elements of V.17
                                                 
16 Eq. (2) is an approximation because it assumes (for tractability) optimal weighting in the portfolio. 
Obviously, ETFs are not optimally weighted – they mostly mimic popular indices such as the S&P 500 or 
Russell indices. 
 Given that uninformed investors of 
individual stocks migrate to more diversified funds and informed investors prefer sector 
funds to diversified funds, the likelihood of informed trade is expected to be lower for 
more diversified portfolios. Therefore, λpf is predicted to be lower for more diversified 
portfolios. The diversification benefit is also higher for more diversified portfolios. That 
is, ceteris paribus, a sector ETF’s lambda is more closely associated with lambdas of 
underlying stocks, as there is less diversification. On the other hand, a well-diversified 
ETF’s lambda is weakly associated with lambdas of individual stocks, and therefore is 
smaller than explained by these stock lambdas. In sum, the first two determinants of λpf 
17 See Appendices A.3-A.6 for determinants of  pfλ . 
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lead to the prediction that λpf is lower for more diversified portfolios than for less 
diversified ones.  
The third determinant of λpf, the base-line uncertainty of a portfolio, however, 
leads to the opposite prediction when combined with the liquidity effect hypothesized in 
the paper. In principle, λpf is not directly determined by underlying stocks’ adverse 
selection costs (λ), but by the diagonal elements of V (underlying stocks’ uncertainties) 
that eventually determine underlying stocks’ adverse selection costs (λ). There is no 
evidence that diversified funds hold stocks that manifest higher or smaller uncertainty 
than sector funds. In other words, the cross-sectional variation among ETFs in the 
diagonal elements of V (and stock lambdas) are not by the cross-sectional variation in the 
degree of diversification of ETFs (except that, as described above, they are more likely to 
be cancelled out by the off-diagonal elements of V if an ETF is more diversified).  
According to the first two hypotheses in the paper, however, lambdas of individual stocks 
increase as stocks are incorporated into ETFs. The increase is greater as the ETFs become 
more diversified. The increased lambdas of individual stocks are larger than explained by 
the diagonal elements of V, and therefore a larger portion of the ETF lambda gets left 
undiversified. This leads to the prediction that λpf is higher for more diversified portfolios. 
Based on these predictions, I provide two conflicting hypotheses as the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: In equilibrium, a portfolio that offers more diversification by 
investing in a broader market index attracts fewer informed traders and more uninformed 
traders, and exhibits less adverse selection. 
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Hypothesis 2b: In equilibrium, a portfolio that offers more diversification by 
investing in a broader market index holds stocks with higher adverse selection costs, and 
exhibits more adverse selection. 
 
It is ultimately an empirical issue to determine the sign of the association between 
diversification and the portfolio-level adverse selection. However, the above conflicting 
hypotheses are based on distinct explanations. Therefore, I attempt to test whether the 
effect of both informed trades and the diversification benefit on ETF lambdas is different 
from the effect of increased lambdas of underlying stocks. In the next section, I provide 
variable definitions, the description of data, and the empirical test design. 
 
 
3. Variable Measurement and Data Description 
In this section, I describe how I measure variables and the dataset used to 
construct the sample. Detailed descriptions are provided on the measurement of the 
adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads, the percentage of a firm’s shares held by 
ETFs (which is the main test variable), the timing of variable measurement, and control 
variables. 
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3.1. Variable measurement 
Adverse Selection:  
I estimate the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (LAMBDA) 
using the method suggested by Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans [1997]. The 
Madhavan et al. [1997] measure of LAMBDA is slightly modified to be used in cross-
sectional analyses (Armstrong, Core, Taylor, and Verrecchia [2009]) with adjustment of 
the effect of the magnitude of a price. This measure of LAMBDA is estimated in two-
stage regressions using intra-day trade and quote data gathered from the Trades and 
Automated Quotes (TAQ) database. I gather TAQ data for the periods between 2002 and 
2008 for all actively traded firms with required Compustat and CRSP data available. First, 
trades and quotes are matched following the Lee and Ready [1991] method that 
determines whether a trade is buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. The sign of a trade, xt, is 
set to be +1 if the trade is buyer-initiated and -1 if seller-initiated. Using these signs of 
trades, I estimate the firm-specific auto-regressive coefficient ρ from the following 
regression in each month: 
xt = ρxt-1 + et                                    (3) 
Then, in the following second-stage regression, adverse selection (λ) is estimated as the 
sensitivity of the change in the mid-point of bid and ask prices, deflated by the previous 
trade’s mid-point of bid and ask prices, to the residual of the first-stage regression.  
(pt- pt-1)/pt-1 = φ(xt –xt-1)  + λ (xt – ρxt-1) + ut,   (4) 
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where φ is interpreted as the dealer cost component of bid-ask spreads (the dealer’s 
compensation for risk-bearing, transaction, and inventory holdings) and λ as the adverse 
selection cost component of bid-ask spreads. This λ is used as the main variable 
LAMBDA in this paper. LAMBDA is bounded by zero and one, but the actual data often 
produce a LAMBDA that is negative or larger than one. I exclude these out-of-range 
observations from the analysis based on the assumption that these observations are 
statistical outliers and do not threaten the validity of the Madhavan et al. [1997] method 
of estimating the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads.18
 
 Finally, LAMBDA is 
multiplied by 100 and expressed as a percentage. 
The percentage of shares outstanding held by ETFs: 
The Thomson Financial (S12) database provides information on stocks held by 
ETFs and mutual funds. I gather information on stocks held by all U.S. equity ETFs 
between 2002 and 2008 and calculate the daily percentage of each firm’s shares held by 
                                                 
18 The study by Henker and Wang [2006] argues that matching trades and quotes assuming a one second 
delay between them is more suitable than Lee and Ready [1991]’s “five-second rule” to match quotes and 
trades. They find that 53% of the adverse selection component estimated using the Huang and Stoll [1997] 
method for S&P 500 firms in 1999 are negative and significant, and the percentage is decreased to 14% if 
the “one-second rule” is used. For the sample used in this paper, I use the Madhavan et al. [1997] method 
combined with Lee and Ready [1991]’s “five-second rule” and find only 1% of the firm-month lambdas are 
negative. Henker and Wang [2006] also notes that the Huang and Stoll [1997] method is less widely used 
than the Madhavan et al. [1997] method due to the high percentage of negative lambdas, implying that it is 
less of an issue with Madhavan et al. [1997].  Nevertheless, I match trades and quotes with one second 
suggested by Henker and Wang [2006] to see if the “five-second rule” compared to the “one-second rule” 
poses any concern. I find that 1.2% of the observations estimated by the “one-second rule” have negative 
lambdas. Although approximately 20% of negative lambdas from the “five-second rule” can be replaced by 
positive lambdas from the “one-second rule”, I do not combine lambdas from these two tick rules to 
maintain consistency of the sample. Instead, I exclude those negative lambda observations from the sample. 
The results do not change if I replace negative lambda observations from the “five-second rule” with 
positive lambda observations from the “one-second rule”, or replace them with zeros. In the ETF sample, 
the larger portion of ETF-month observations (23.5%) yields negative lambdas than in the firm sample. I 
examine negative lambdas for ETFs in 2005 and similar sized random sample of positive lambdas in 2005 
to see the significance of lambdas, and find that these negative lambdas are all insignificant whereas 91% 
of positive lambdas are significant. I exclude negative lambda observations from the ETF sample. 
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ETFs (ETF_%HLD). Firms that are not held by any ETF in the sample periods are also 
included in the sample with ETF_%HLD=0. The final sample includes 152,151 firm-
quarter ETF_%HLD observations of 8,420 firms. Because the S12 database provides 
holdings data that are reported quarterly in most cases, I assume that holdings on the 
reporting date are applied to dates between the reporting date and the latest date among 
the following: the prior reporting date, 365 days prior to the reporting date, or the ETF 
inception date. ETF_%HLD is the quarterly average of daily percentages of a firm’s 
shares held by ETFs. 
 
The percentage of shares outstanding held by mutual funds: 
Index mutual funds provide uninformed investors with similar benefits of passive 
index trading with relatively low costs. To examine whether index mutual funds also 
decrease liquidity in the markets of their underlying stocks, I construct MFID_%HLD, 
the percentage of a firm’s shares held by index mutual funds. MFID_%HLD is calculated 
in the same manner as ETF_%HLD, using funds in the S12 database that are manually 
identified as index mutual funds from their fund names. To use as a control for the role of 
actively managed mutual funds, MFAM_%HLD is calculated likewise as the percentage 
of a firm’s shares held by actively managed mutual funds.  
 
Post-period and pre-period for change variables: 
In addition to firm-quarter observations, I use change variables between a pre-
period and a post-period in order to examine the effect of changes in explanatory 
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variables on the change in firms’ adverse selection costs. I define an event period as a 
quarter in which new ETFs are introduced, set the timing of this quarter to be t=0, and 
define the pre-period as quarters from t=-k to t=-1, where k varies from 1 to 4. Likewise, 
the post-period is defined as quarters from t=1 to t=k, where k=1,..,4. I calculate change 
variables as the post-period averages minus the pre-period averages. 
 
Control variables: 
To determine the control variables for the regression of LAMBDA, I again turn to 
the theoretical definition of adverse selection by Kyle [1985] described in eq. (1) of the 
previous section. In this model, the adverse selection cost is defined as 
nhN
Nt
++
=
1
1
λ  
where N is the number of informed investors, t is the precision (reciprocal of variance) of 
noise trades, h is the precision of a stock’s expected value, and n is the precision of public 
information. Therefore, control variables are categorized, though not mutually 
exclusively, into variables related to the number of informed traders and noise traders, 
those related to the uncertainties about the firm value, and those related to the 
informational environment.19
First, SIZE and BTM determine adverse selection by affecting relatively long-term, 
assessed uncertainties about firm values. They also affect firms’ information 
environments. SIZE is the log of one plus market value (CRSP price * shares), calculated 
  
                                                 
19 Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1998] use three aspects of the lambda in the Kyle [1985] model to control 
for firm characteristics. They control for the variance of the asset payoff by the return volatility, the 
precision of private information by the number of analysts, and the size of noise trades by the size of the 
firm. Hedge and McDermott [2004b] also use the Kyle [1985] lambda to find out firm characteristics that 
determine adverse selection. 
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daily and averaged over the quarter. BTM is the book-to-market assets ratio calculated as 
Total assets / (Total assets – Book value of equity + Market value of equity) on the 
quarter-end date. Total assets and the book value of equity are from the Compustat 
quarterly database and the market value of equity is calculated using the CRSP database. 
Trading volume is generally higher for large firms, and stocks with high trading volume 
are considered to be more liquid.  VOLUME is turnover calculated as the log of the ratio 
of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP trading volume and one plus the number 
of shares outstanding.  
The return volatility and absolute abnormal returns indicate higher uncertainties 
about firm values and inferior public disclosure. STDRET is the annualized time-series 
standard deviation of CRSP daily returns, calculated each quarter. ABS_ABNRET is the 
absolute abnormal returns in each quarter, calculated as the absolute value of the 
difference between the cumulative return over the quarter and the cumulative value-
weighted market return over the quarter. PRICE is the log of one plus the quarterly 
average of daily CRSP prices. The number of analysts proxies for the superior 
informational environment and a larger firm size. ANALYST is the log of one plus the 
quarterly average number of analysts from I/B/E/S. The percentage of institutional 
ownership and the number of institutions proxy for the likelihood of informed trades, 
firm sizes, and the competition among informed investors. INST_% is the percentage of 
institutional ownership and INST_N is the log of one plus the quarterly number of 
institutional owners, calculated with the Thomson Financial Spectrum (S34) data.  
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Additional Control Variables: 
With the wide availability of computers, the frequency of intra-day trades, 
especially small trades, has notably increased in the past several years. The average daily 
number of trades has increased from 513 ($12 million) in the first quarter of 2002 to 
6,702 ($35 million) in the last quarter of 2008. A trade is categorized to be small if it is 
smaller than $5,000. The percentage of small trades was 61% (39% in dollar volume) in 
the first quarter of 2001 and 89% (70% in dollar volume) in the last quarter of 2008. As 
stock lambdas can be affected by the macro-trend of the volume of small trades in the 
market, I include the quarterly average of daily percentages of intraday small trades 
(PST) as an additional control variable. To further control for the market trends, I also 
include the market-wide average of LAMBDA (LAMBDA_MKT) for each quarter. Finally, 
a dummy variable for a calendar year is included to control for the year fixed effect.  
In the ETF-level regression, I include the daily percentage of intraday small trades 
averaged for a month (ETF_PST), and the average ETF_LAMBDA of all ETFs 
(ETF_LAMBDA_MKT) as additional control variables. 
 
ETF diversification: 
I construct two measures of the degree of diversification of an ETF. The first one 
is 0/1 dummy variable (ETF_DVF1), which is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF and 1 if an 
ETF is a diversified ETF based on its investment objective. To determine ETF investment 
objectives, I use both the “Morningstar Style box™” and ETF descriptions for 
 
27 
investors.20 The second measure of diversification is based on the factor analysis of three 
variables related to portfolio diversification: The number of stocks, the average of 
underlying stocks’ weights, and the diversification score ranging from 0 to 3 based on 
investment objectives of ETFs.21
As for firm-level observations during event quarters when new ETFs are 
introduced, I calculate STK_DVF1 and STK_DVF2, dummy variables that measure the 
degree of diversification of ETFs in which a firm is newly included. STK_DVF1 
(STK_DVF2) is calculated with ETF_DVF1 (ETF_DVF2) assigned to newly introduced 
ETFs as described above. In case a firm gets included in one ETF during an event quarter, 
STK_DVF1 and STK_DVF2 for the firm-quarter are simply ETF_DVF1 and ETF_DVF2 
of the ETF holding the firm’s shares. In the event of a firm getting included in multiple 
ETFs in one quarter, ETF_DVF1 and ETF_DVF2 of these ETFs are weighted by the 
number of shares held by these ETFs. For example, suppose two ETFs are introduced 
during a certain quarter and they both hold a firm’s shares. 100 shares of the firm are held 
by one ETF with ETF_DVF1=0, and 200 shares of the firm are held by the other ETF 
with ETF_DVF1=1. Then the value-weighted diversification score for the firm-quarter is 
 ETF_DVF2 is defined as high/low rank of this factor 
score, calculated each month.  
                                                 
20 The Morningstar Style box is a 3 X 3 box with the growth level (value, blend, growth) along the vertical 
axis and size (large, mid, small) along the horizontal axis. Sample ETFs’ positions on this nine-grid box are 
manually collected from http://corporate.morningstar.com. Furthermore, classifications for ETFs (e.g. 
large-cap growth ETF, financial industry ETF, etc.) provided by internet portals (Yahoo finance and 
Google finance) are collected. When the Morningstar Style box and ETF classifications do not coincide 
(e.g. funds that are not size-based are often categorized as mid-cap funds), I discretionally decide between 
the two from reading descriptions. 
21 The diversification score is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF, 1 if an ETF duplicates size and growth based 
index, 1 if an ETF duplicates either a size-based index or a growth-based index, and 3 if an ETF duplicates 
a broad market index. The first diversification measure ETF_DVF1 is 0 if this diversification score is 0 and 
1 if it is between 1 and 3.  
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calculated to be 0.67. Because 0.67 is closer to 1 than to 0, STK_DVF1 is defined to be 1 
and the firm-quarter is considered to be an event set off by well-diversified ETFs. As 
well-diversified ETFs with ETF_DVF1=1 or ETF_DVF2=1 generally hold larger 
numbers of firms (and in many cases larger number of shares of each firm), the event 
study sample averages of these 0/1 dummy variables (STK_DVF1 and STK_DVF2) are 
0.83 and 0.87, respectively. That is, from 83% to 87% of the firm-quarters in the event 
study sample are categorized as events triggered by well-diversified ETFs.22
 
  
3.2. Data Description  
I identify U.S. equity ETFs between 2002 and 2008, and obtain daily trading and 
quote data of these ETFs from the TAQ and daily market data from the CRSP. Figure 1 
shows the number of ETFs used in the analysis. In the first sample quarter, a total of 63 
ETFs are included in the sample, of which 32 ETFs are sector ETFs and 31 are 
diversified broader market index ETFs. In the last sample quarter, the number increases 
to 273, of which 133 are sector ETFs and 140 are diversified ETFs. Figure 2 shows the 
total market value of these sample ETFs. The total market value was approximately $99 
billion in the first quarter of 2002, and grew five times by the end of 2008 to $448 billion. 
Although the numbers of ETFs are balanced between sector ETFs and diversified ETFs, 
the percentage of sector ETFs’ market value is on average 13% of the total market value. 
I download these ETFs’ holdings data from the Thomson S12 database and construct 
                                                 
22 It is why I adopt diversification measures quarterly-ranked among ETFs, weight these rank dummies, and 
adjust the weighted dummies into 0/1 dummies for firm-level observations. If I rank diversification 
measures among the event firm-quarter observations in order to construct 0/1 dummies, the degree of 
diversification of newly introduced ETFs would be understated.  
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ETF-month observations. The final ETF-month sample includes 8,983 ETF-month 
observations of 294 ETFs. 
All stocks actively traded between 2002 and 2008 are included in the firm-level 
sample. For these stocks, I obtain daily trading and quote data from the TAQ. I further 
require firm-quarter observations to have SIZE, BTM, VOLUME, STDRET, 
ABS_ABNRET, and PRICE calculated using the CRSP daily database and the 
COMPUSTAT quarterly database. In addition, ANALYST is calculated with the I/B/E/S 
detail data, and INST_% and INST_N are calculated with the I/B/E/S detail database and 
the Thomson Financial (S34) data. Missing values of ANALYST, INST_%, or INST_N are 
set to be zero. The final firm-quarter sample includes 152,151 firm-quarter observations 
of 8,420 firms. Using the holdings data of the sample ETFs, I calculate ETF_%HLD as 
the percentage of a firm’s shares held by ETFs each quarter. The ETF_%HLD in figure 3 
exhibits a similar pattern to figure 2. ETF_%HLD has grown from 0.8% in 2002 to 3.5% 
in 2008.23
Table 1 presents size, growth, and the industry compositions of sample ETFs, and 
reports the average ETF_LAMBDA for each group.
 Diversified ETFs hold on average 10 times the number of firm shares that 
sector ETFs hold.  
24
                                                 
23 In the first quarter of 2002, 54% of all actively traded firms were held by ETFs. In the last quarter of 
2008, 80% of firms were held by ETFs.  
 The left panel shows that the sample 
is composed of 4,667 broad market index ETF-months and 4,316 sector ETF-months. 
Broad market index ETFs’ average ETF_LAMBDA (0.022% of price) is 15% smaller 
24 LAMBDA and ETF_LAMBDA are expressed in % of price. In eq. (4), φ represents the dealer cost 
component of bid-ask spreads, and λ represents the adverse selection cost component of bid-ask spreads, 
LAMBDA. Therefore, the implied bid-ask spreads calculated from eq. (4) is (φ+ λ), which is in % of price. 
The adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads in % of implied bid-ask spreads is calculated as λ/(φ+ 
λ). 
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than the sector ETFs’ average ETF_LAMBDA (0.026% of price). The right panel 
summarizes the average ETF_LAMBDAs of ETFs that are excluded from the sample, 
either because they are not holding U.S. assets or because they are non-equity ETFs. The 
leveraged ETFs using derivatives based on domestic equities instead of holding stocks 
are categorized as non-equity ETFs, and are excluded from the sample. ETF_LAMBDAs 
are notably higher for these out-of-sample ETFs. For example, the average 
ETF_LAMBDA of non-U.S. ETFs is approximately twice higher than the average 
ETF_LAMBDA of the sample ETFs. The average ETF_LAMBDA of non-equity U.S. 
ETFs is approximately four times higher than that of the sample ETFs. The broad market 
index ETFs that are not in the sample exhibit an almost two times higher average 
ETF_LAMBDA, and the sector ETFs that are not in the sample exhibit an almost three 
times higher average ETF_LAMBDA than similar ETFs in the sample.25 This comparison 
implies that information environments for domestic equities are richer than for 
international equities, commodities, or fixed assets. Also, higher return volatility 
provided by leveraged ETFs contributes to higher adverse selection of those ETFs. In 
summary, the sample selection procedure results in limiting the sample to relatively low 
adverse selection ETFs. 26
                                                 
25 The difference between in-sample ETFs and out-of-sample ETFs is not as striking if I compare median 
values of ETF_LAMBDAs, but ETFs that are not in the sample largely exhibit higher median 
ETF_LAMBDAs. 
 
26 The reason why only U.S. equity ETFs are chosen is the availability of holdings data. This sample 
selection procedure results in the loss of a potentially interesting test setting of investors’ migration to non-
equity ETFs (e.g., leveraged ETFs, commodity ETFs, fixed-asset ETFs etc.) or international ETFs. 
However, limiting the sample to U.S. equity ETFs provides controlled setting to test the direct migration 
from individual stocks to ETFs holding those individual stocks due to private information. Also, the test of 
dynamics between lambdas of individual stocks and ETF lambdas is feasible by this limitation. If 
underlying stocks of international ETFs and the market data of these underlying stocks are easily acquirable, 
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 Panel A of table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the firm-quarter sample. 
The average LAMBDA is 0.159%, which is higher than the average ETF_LAMBDAs of 
most groups of ETFs in table 1. On average, 1.3% of firm shares are held by ETFs. 
MFID_%HLD, the percentage of a firm’s shares held by index mutual funds, is on 
average 0.4%. , MFAM_%HLD, the percentage of firm shares held by actively managed 
mutual funds, is on average 9.6%, which is much higher than the averages of 
ETF_%HLD and MFID_%HLD. The average size of the sample firms is $2.2 billion and 
the average book-to-market ratio is 0.76. Panel A of table 3 shows that LAMBDA is 
significantly negatively correlated with SIZE, VOLUME, PRICE, ANALYST, INST_%, 
and INST_N. 
Panel B of table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of changes in the variables in 
panel A, with the pre-period (post-period) set to be one quarter prior to (after) the event 
quarter. LAMBDA decreases by 0.001% on average over one quarter pre- and post-
periods. ETF_%HLD increases by 0.4% on average. Surrounding these event quarters, 
the percentages of firm shares held by index or actively managed mutual funds do not 
change on average. The average institutional ownership increases both in percentage and 
in the number of institutions.  Panel C of table 2 exhibits the descriptive statistics of 
D_LAMBDA and D_ETF_%HLD with the pre- and post-periods ranging from two to four 
quarters. Panel B of table 3 suggests that the change in LAMBDA is highly correlated 
with changes in SIZE, BTM, VOLUME, and PRICE. It is also noteworthy that the change 
in the percentage of institutional ownership exhibits the highest positive correlation with 
                                                                                                                                                 
they will constitute a sub-sample of higher adverse selection observations. I do not expect adding 
international ETF data changes the predictions and results of this paper. 
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D_ETF_%HLD. This supports the premise behind the first hypothesis that increased 
ETF_%HLD motivates uninformed investors to leave the market of individual stocks, and 
therefore the informed trade becomes more crowded. 
Panel D of table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the ETF-month sample. 
The average ETF_LAMBDA is 0.024% and is much smaller than the average LAMBDA 
(0.16%) of the firm-quarter sample in panel A of table 2. However, ETF_LAMBDA is on 
average not smaller than the value-weighted average of underlying stocks’ LAMBDAs 
(STK_LAMBDA). The average size of the sample ETFs is $2 billion, and return volatility 
is notably lower for ETFs (0.25) than for individual stocks (17.12). Absolute abnormal 
return is also much lower for ETFs. Both the average percentage of institutional 
ownership and the number of institutional investors of ETFs are smaller than those of 
individual stocks. Panel C of table 3 shows that the two proxies for the degree of 
diversification of an ETF, ETF_DVF1 and ETF_DVF2, are highly correlated with each 
other and exhibit similar correlations with other variables. ETF_VOLUME is highly 
correlated with ETF_INST_%, implying that although uninformed investors have stronger 
incentives to trade ETFs than informed investors, institutional investors also play an 
active role in trading ETFs. These institutional investors’ trades could be informed ones 
based on their superior information about the market-wide factor or routine hedge 
activities against trading individual stocks or index futures. 
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4. Research Design and Test Results 
In this section, I describe how I structure empirical tests. The tests examine the 
effect of an introduction of tradable baskets of stocks on the incentive of uninformed 
traders of underlying stocks of these baskets. I estimate regressions of the adverse 
selection component of bid-ask spreads on the percentage of a firm’s shares held by ETFs 
and control variables  
In section 4.1, I discuss and report results of levels regressions (table 4) and 
change regressions (tables 5 and 6) using the firm-quarter sample to test hypotheses 1-a 
and 1-b. In section 4.2, I discuss ETF-level regressions, for testing hypotheses 2-a and 2-
b, and discuss results (table 7). 
 
4.1. Firm-level tests 
The first hypothesis predicts that the introduction of tradable baskets provides an 
incentive and an opportunity for uninformed investors to trade these baskets instead of 
individual stocks. As a result, the adverse selection cost for an individual stock is 
expected to increase.27
First, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression to investigate whether 
firms with a higher percentage of shares held by ETFs exhibit higher adverse selection 
costs. I estimate a pooled regression with two-way cluster robust standard errors (Gow, 
Ormazabal, and Taylor [2009]). 
 
                                                 
27 Uninformed investors can switch from mutual funds to ETFs, not from individual stocks. Since these 
uninformed investors did not provide markets for individual stocks with liquidity before switching, the 
effect of this kind of switch on the adverse selection costs of individual stocks should be non-existent. 
Therefore, I assume the likelihood of this switch does not affect nor weakens my test results. 
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ETF_%HLD is the main test variable and defined to be the percentage of shares 
held by all U.S. equity ETFs in each quarter. I expect 1β to be positive, consistent with 
the first hypothesis. The coefficient on SIZE is predicted to be negative, and the 
coefficient on BTM is predicted to be positive (Hedge and McDermott [2004b]). Trading 
volume is higher for large firms with liquid stocks. Therefore, I expect the association 
between VOLUME and LAMBDA to be negative. The return volatility and absolute 
abnormal returns indicate higher uncertainty during trading hours and inferior public 
disclosure. I expect both coefficients on STDRET and ABS_ABNRET to be positive. Prior 
studies suggest that stocks with higher prices are less liquid as some individual investors 
cannot afford the minimum trading units, leading to the prediction that 7β will be 
positive. 28
7β
 However, higher prices are positively correlated with sizes of stocks, and 
therefore  can be negative to the extent that price proxies for the firm size.  
I expect 8β  to exhibit a negative sign as Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1995] finds 
a negative association between analyst following and adverse selection. Institutional 
ownership can positively affect adverse selection if it proxies for a large amount of 
                                                 
28 Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1995] and Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1998] find that the price level is 
one of the important determinants of the lambda. Easley, O’Hara, and Saar [2001] finds that stock splits 
resulting in lower prices increase uninformed trades. 
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private information held by a few informed investors. On the other hand, if institutional 
ownership is higher only because institutional investors are numerous, the above Kyle 
[1985] model suggests that it leads to lower adverse selection due to competition among 
informed investors.29 I include two proxies for the institutional ownership: INST_% and 
INST_N. The percentage of institutional ownership (INST_%) is predicted to be positively 
associated with LAMBDA given the number of institutional investors (INST_N) and other 
controls. Likewise, the number of institutional investors (INST_N) is predicted to be 
negatively associated with LAMBDA after I control for the level of INST_% and other 
variables.30
Panel A of table 4 reports the results of the regressions in eq. (5) with the firm-
quarter sample. Column 1 presents a baseline regression on control variables. All 
coefficients exhibit predicted signs except on ANALYST. PRICE is negatively associated 
with LAMBDA. In the second column, I find the main test variable ETF_%HLD, the 
percentage of shares held by ETFs, exhibits a significant and positive association with 
LAMBDA. The result is consistent with predictions in hypothesis 1-a. The result is robust 
to controlling for the market average of LAMBDA (LAMBDA_MKT) and the percentage 
of small trades (PST) in the next two columns. In panel B of table 4, I include the 
percentage of shares held by mutual funds (MFID_%HLD and/or MFAM_%HLD) either 
as a control variable or as an alternative variable to ETF_%HLD. As predicted, the first 
 
                                                 
29 Glosten and Harris [1988] suggests mixed associations between institutional or insider ownership and 
adverse selection. Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr [2001] also provides mixed predictions on how 
institutional ownership affects adverse selection. 
30 The test results do not change qualitatively if I include either INST_% or INST_N. However, the main 
results are stronger if only INST_N is included and weaker if only INST_% is included than if both are 
controlled for. The explanatory power is highest when both are included. 
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three columns show that MFID_%HLD exhibits a similar effect on LAMBDA to 
ETF_%HLD. When both ETF_%HLD and MFID_%HLD are included in the regression, 
both are positively and significantly associated with LAMBDA. This result is robust when 
MFAM_%HLD is included. The result is also robust when I sum the ETF_%HLD and 
MFID_%HLD, and use it in the last column (ID_%HLD) as a proxy for passive 
investment opportunity. 
As an additional test of hypothesis 1-a, I estimate the following regression using 
change variables with firm-quarters in which new ETFs are introduced. I estimate a 
pooled regression with two-way cluster robust standard errors (Gow et al. [2009]). I 
expect D_LAMBDA, the change in LAMBDA, to be positively associated with 
D_ETF_%HLD. I also expect other variables to exhibit the same signs as in the levels 
regression. 
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Table 5 reports the results of the regressions of the change in LAMBDA 
(D_LAMBDA) on the change in ETF_%HLD (D_ETF_%HLD) calculated over various 
lengths of pre- and post-periods. The first two columns of panel A of table 5 report the 
results of regressions using these change variables with one-quarter pre- and post-periods. 
D_ETF_%HLD over one quarter is positively associated with D_LAMBDA. As the period 
 
37 
length increases, the association between D_ETF_%HLD and D_LAMBDA becomes 
more significant. As an additional 1% of a firm’s shares are held by ETFs, LAMBDA 
increases by 0.003% over the next four quarters, which is approximately 2% of the 
average value of LAMBDA during the sample period. Note that when new ETFs are 
introduced, there is on average no change in MFID_%HLD and MFAM_%HLD (panel B 
of table 2). Nevertheless, D_MFID_%HLD affects D_LAMBDA while D_MFAM_%HLD 
exhibits a weak negative or no effect on D_LAMBDA, implying that the markets react 
differently to index funds and actively managed funds. In panel B of table 5, I use post-
period variables instead of change variables for some of the control variables: SIZE, BTM, 
ANALYST, INST_%, and INST_N. These control variables represent relatively stable firm 
characteristics that are not expected to fluctuate over a few quarters. The result is robust 
to this alternative specification. 
Hypothesis 1-b is based on the premise that a security-specific informed 
investor’s incentive to become informed about funds is stronger for sector funds than for 
diversified funds. If a security-specific informed investor chooses to switch, being 
informed about a sector is less costly than being informed about the economy. This 
prediction implies that an increased ETF_%HLD (D_ETF_%HLD) by newly introduced 
diversified ETFs offers a stronger incentive for uninformed investors to choose these 
ETFs over an individual stock than when ETF_%HLD is increased by sector ETFs. 
I estimate the change regression in eq. (7) using the interaction term of 
D_ETF_%HLD with either STK_DVF1 or STK_DVF2. STK_DVF1 and STK_DVF2 are 0 
if the firm-level event of being included in newly introduced ETFs is triggered by less 
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diversified ETFs, and 1 if it is triggered by more diversified ETFs. I expect that the 
interaction term yields a positive coefficient 3β . 
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Table 6 reports the results of the regression in eq. (7), and provides modest 
evidence supporting hypothesis 1-b. The first two columns demonstrate that, over one 
quarter pre- and post-periods, there is a weak significant difference between the 
introduction of diversified ETFs, and the introduction of sector ETFs in terms of the 
effect on LAMBDA. The regression results over two to three quarter pre- and post-periods, 
however, do not support this prediction. Over the longest pre- and post-periods, the 
introduction of well-diversified ETFs affects D_LAMBDA more strongly than less 
diversified ETFs do.  
In summary, at the firm level, the availability of ETFs increases adverse selection 
of individual stocks as uninformed investors switch to trading ETFs. This effect is 
stronger if ETFs are more diversified. 
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4.2. ETF-level tests 
Hypothesis 2-a suggests that ETFs that hold more diversified portfolios exhibit 
smaller adverse selection due to liquidity and diversification benefits, while hypothesis 2-
b predicts that these ETFs exhibit larger adverse selection due to underlying stocks’ 
increased adverse selection costs. Hypothesis 2-b contradicts hypothesis 2-a because of 
the endogenous nature of STK_LAMBDA introduced by hypothesis 1-a. That is, 
STK_LAMBDA increases as stocks are held by more diversified ETFs with lower 
ETF_LAMBDA, but at the same time ETF_LAMBDA increases in STK_LAMBDA. To 
address this endogeneity concern, I estimate the following simultaneous regression using 
the value-weighted average of stocks’ idiosyncratic volatilities (STK_IDIO) as an 
instrumental variable. Stocks’ idiosyncratic volatilities determine these stocks’ adverse 
selection, but are expected to be exogenous to the adverse selection cost of an ETF that 
holds these stocks.31
The predicted value of STK_LAMBDA is calculated from the first-stage pooled 
regression in the following eq. (8). I estimate the second-stage pooled regression of 
ETF_LAMBDA on the predicted STK_LAMBDA as in the following eq. (9) with two-way 
cluster robust standard errors (Gow et al. [2009]). 
 
                                                 
31 Idiosyncratic volatility is the residual return volatility after controlling for factors determining stock 
returns at the market-portfolio level (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang [2006]). Spiegel and Wang [2005] 
finds that idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity measures such as the Kyle [1995] lambda are positively 
associated. Although the study does not provide a clear explanation on why liquidity and idiosyncratic 
volatility are associated, it speculates that the association is the reason why both variables generate mixed 
views and empirical links to stock returns. I use the study by Spiegel and Wang [2005] as the support of 
using STK_IDIO as instrumental variable associated with STK_LAMBDA. Whether either liquidity or 
idiosyncratic volatility is priced or not is out of scope of this paper. I proceed with an assumption that 
idiosyncratic volatility is not priced, is diversified away at a portfolio level, and therefore does not affect 
portfolio-level variables such as ETF_LAMBDA. However, if idiosyncratic volatility is priced, my rational 
to use it as an exogenous variable to ETF_LAMBDA is weakened. 
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According to hypothesis 2-a, ETF_LAMBDA is lower for more diversified ETFs. 
Therefore, I expect ETF_DVF to exhibit a negative association with ETF_LAMBDA. The 
association between STK_LAMBDA and ETF_LAMBDA ( 2β  or 32 ββ + ) can be either 
positive or negative.  It will be positive to the extent that STK_LAMBDA represents the 
underlying assets’ uncertainties which collectively determine ETF_LAMBDA. It will be 
negative to the extent that the outflow of uninformed investors from individual assets 
increases STK_LAMBDA (hypothesis 1-a).  
Whether the association between ETF_LAMBDA and STK_LAMBDA differs 
between more diversified ETFs and less diversified ones is also an empirical question. If 
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diversification of underlying stocks’ uncertainties is the main driver of the association 
between ETF_LAMBDA and STK_LAMBDA, then 3β on the interaction term is expected 
to exhibit a negative sign as the diversification benefit is stronger for more diversified 
portfolios (hypothesis 2-a). If the increase in STK_LAMBDA and the decrease in 
ETF_LAMBDA due to migration of uninformed trades is the main driver of the 
association between these two variables, then 3β  is expected to show a positive sign. 
Therefore, as a test of hypothesis 2-a (2-b), I predict that 3β on the interaction term shows 
a negative (positive) sign.  
Table 7 presents the results of the regressions in eq. (9). The first two columns 
present the second stage regression results with two diversification dummy variables that 
are calculated based on investment objectives (ETF_DVF1) and the factor analysis of 
three variables related to portfolio diversification (ETF_DVF2). Alternatively, the value 
weighted average of underlying stocks’ ETF_%HLDs (STK_ETF_%HLD) is used as the 
endogenous variable. This usage of STK_ETF_%HLD instead of STK_LAMBDA is based 
on the first hypothesis that ETF_%HLD increases LAMBDA. Columns 3 and 4 present the 
second stage regression results with two diversification dummy variables on 
STK_ETF_%HLD. 
As hypothesis 2-a predicts, ETF_DVF in the first column is negatively associated 
with ETF_LAMBDA. This implies that more diversified ETFs exhibit lower adverse 
selection because these ETFs become more liquid as more uninformed investors trade 
these ETFs. In contrast, the interaction term of STK_LAMBDA and ETF_DVF exhibits a 
positive coefficient supporting hypothesis 2-b that higher adverse selection costs of 
 
42 
underlying stocks of more diversified ETFs lead to higher adverse selection costs of these 
ETFs. This result is largely robust to alternative measures of ETF_DVF and to using 
STK_ETF_%HLD as a proxy for STK_LAMBDA. 
In summary, I attempt to separate the determinants of ETF_LAMBDA into the 
likelihood of informed trades, the diversification benefit, and the underlying stocks’ 
uncertainties at the portfolio level. I find that smaller adverse selection costs of 
diversified ETFs attract more uninformed investors and this in turn makes stocks held by 
these diversified ETFs become even more illiquid. 
 
4.3. Small trades 
A key issue in this paper is to understand the effects when uninformed individual 
investors migrate to trading passive baskets of stocks. Therefore, I further investigate 
whether the availability of ETFs affects the percentage of intra-day small trades (PST) of 
individual stocks, which can be considered an alternative measure of the noise trades by 
uninformed investors. I define a small trade as one with a dollar value smaller than 
$5,000. The weakness of this measure as a direct measure of liquidity is the ad-hoc nature 
of the variable construction. For example, if a large institution has a capability of 
automating orders to frequently place small orders than $5,000 instead of one big order, 
then PST as a proxy for uninformed trades gets overstated.32
                                                 
32 Barclay and Warner [1993] and Chakravarty [2001] refer to the similar behavior of informed investors as 
“stealth-trading” and find that informed trades are concentrated on medium-sized trades (trades of 500-
9,999 shares). Although these studies and my test use different set of samples, the percentage of medium-
sized trades in their studies does not exceed the bottom 50%. Given that the average value PST is 0.72, 
most of small-trades in this paper may be categorized as medium-sized trades in their studies. 
 Nevertheless, the analysis of 
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PST in the context of uninformed investors’ migration seems to offer an interesting 
supplement to the main test in the paper. 
First, I run the regression in eq. (5) with the dependent variable replaced by PST 
and report the results in panel A of table 8. Contrary to the prediction that ETF_%HLD 
decreases PST (to the extent that PST proxies for uninformed trades), the coefficient on 
ETF_%HLD is positive. ID_%HLD, the sum of ETF_%HLD and MFID_%HLD, also 
exhibit a positive association with PST. However, MFID_%HLD exhibits a negative and 
significant association with PST. Even though I am reassured by the negative sign of the 
coefficient on MFID_%HLD, the difference between ETF_%HLD and MFID_%HLD in 
their effects on PST is puzzling; this contrasts with the similarity in their influences on 
LAMBDA. I suspect that the uptrend of PST in the sample is too strong (from the average 
of 513/day in 2002 to 6,702/day in 2008) and biases the result, even though I include the 
market average (PST_MKT) as a control for the trend. 
I run the change regression the eq. (6) with the dependent variable replaced by 
D_PST. Contrary to the levels regression result, the result in panel B of table 8 supports 
the prediction that the availability of ETFs decreases PST. In the first three columns, 
D_ETF_%HLD exhibits a negative and significant association with D_PST, implying that 
up to three quarters after the introduction of ETFs, PST decreases in ETF_%HLD. 
I further run the IV regression similar to eq. (7) and eq. (8) with the dependent 
variable replaced by D_PST, and report the result on panel C of table 8. The interaction 
term of D_ETF_%HLD and STK_DVF exhibits a weak significant and negative 
association. The result confirms the prediction that more diversified ETFs have 
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advantages in attracting individual investors. The comparison of table 6 and panel C of 
table 8 suggests that the impact of D_ETF_%HLD on D_PST is weaker but faster (in 
effect in one or two quarters) than the effect on D_LAMBDA (weakly in effect in a 
quarter but eventually in four quarters). 
In summary, I find that the availability of index funds decreases small trades. The 
evidence is mixed in the equilibrium but clearer in the event study that presumably 
isolates the effect in a more efficient manner. 
 
4.4. Self-selection problem 
In this paper, the hypothesized positive association between LAMBDA and 
ETF_%HLD is attributed to the migration of uninformed investors, which, as a result, 
exacerbates adverse selection. However, one can suspect that ETFs tend to pick and hold 
stocks with higher LAMBDAs, as both the marginal benefit and the market demand can 
be larger for bundling stocks with higher LAMBDAs. If this is true, the positive 
association between LAMBDA and ETF_%HLD can be driven by the self-selection 
process rather than by the change in liquidity.  
It is challenging to econometrically dismiss this alternative explanation, due to the 
difficulty of finding instrument variables uncorrelated with stock LAMBDA. Instead, I 
provide ETFs’ investment objectives and descriptive statistics as evidence that 
ameliorates concerns about the self-selection issue. The ETFs in the sample are not 
actively managed by fund managers, but passively duplicate market indexes. Some 
indexes being duplicated are implicitly picking stocks with firm characteristics associated 
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with high adverse selection (e.g., small-cap growth funds), but it is not a generalizable 
feature of all ETFs in the sample.  
In figure 4, I present the comparison between the average LAMBDA of firms that 
are not included in any ETF in a given quarter (ETF_%HLD=0), and the average 
LAMBDA of firms held by ETFs (ETF_%HLD>0). Firms that are held by ETFs exhibit 
lower LAMBDA, supporting the argument that it is doubtful whether ETFs tend to hold 
high LAMBDA stocks. Figure 5 depicts the average pre-period LAMBDA of firms that are 
held by newly introduced ETFs during the event periods, and the average pre-period 
LAMBDA of the rest of the firms in the sample. During one quarter period prior to the 
event, firms that are included in new ETFs exhibit lower LAMBDAs than firms that are 
not picked by new ETFs. In summary, I argue that, although valid in principle, the self-
selection concern should be minimal in the current data and tests presented in the paper.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the introduction of tradable baskets of stocks 
changes incentives of uninformed investors who find trading individual stocks without 
private information undesirable. The percentage of a firm’s shares held by ETFs is used 
as a proxy for the uninformed investors’ alternative trading opportunities. Using quarterly 
observations of all actively traded firms with required variables between 2002 and 2008, I 
find that the adverse selection cost of a stock increases in uninformed investors’ 
opportunity to trade baskets of stocks. This positive association also holds in the 
regression of change variables calculated over one to four quarters prior and posterior to 
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event quarters in which new ETFs are introduced. Uninformed investors are more likely 
to switch to trade a basket of stocks if the newly available ETF is more diversified, as 
they assess the likelihood of informed trades to be lower for more diversified ETFs than 
for less diversified ETFs. I find modest evidence on the stronger increase in the adverse 
selection costs for stocks held by newly introduced diversified ETFs than for stocks held 
by newly introduced sector ETFs. Overall, this increase in adverse selection due to the 
availability of ETFs is robust to various specifications of the tests.  
As an additional test, I examine whether the portfolio-level adverse selection is 
lower for diversified ETFs than for sector ETFs or higher, as diversified ETFs are more 
likely to hold stocks with higher adverse selection costs. I find mixed evidence that 
potentially supports both of these predictions. ETFs’ adverse selection costs decrease in 
diversification but the adverse selection costs of underlying stocks add up more 
significantly to the adverse selection costs of ETFs when these ETFs are more diversified. 
In conclusion, the introduction of tradable baskets of stocks has an impact on 
uninformed investors’ trading opportunities. Uninformed investors switch to trade 
baskets of stocks, and therefore the adverse selection cost of an individual stock increases 
in the availability of these tradable baskets. This result suggests that adverse selection is 
one of the costs of providing uninformed investors with lower risk trading devices. Even 
though this paper does not provide a comparison of the cost and the benefit of protecting 
uninformed investors, it is worthwhile to note that the new trading vehicles such as ETFs 
offered to uninformed investors can exacerbate the adverse selection of individual stocks, 
and can ultimately increase the adverse selection costs of ETFs.  
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Appendixes
A.1 Imperfect competition model
The value of a rm disclosed by the rm is denoted by ey = eu+e, where eu~N(m; 1
h
)
and e~N(0; 1
n
): h represents the precision assessed by the markets on the ex-ante value
of an asset eu; and n is the precision of the information content of the disclosure ey
(Verrecchia [2001]). The informed investor knows e =  whereas the market maker
only knows ey = y: The informed investor determines his or her demand d based on
knowledge of eu and the demand order gets batched with demand orders generated
from random shocks ex: The total demand is then eD = d+ ex, where ex~N(0; 1
t
). The
market maker executes this combined order at a single price p that is equivalent to
the market makers expectation of the rm value conditional on the disclosure and
the total demand E
eujey; eD. Before submitting the informed order d; the informed
investor expects how the market will come up with this price p based on ey and eD.
The informed investor conjectures the following eq.(A1.1), where  represents the
price reaction to surprise in disclosure and  represents information asymmetry.
p = m+ (y  m) + D (A1.1)
Then, the informed investor chooses the order amount d that maximizes his or
her expected prot.
Max
d
[dE (eu  epjeu = u; ey = y)]
=Max
d
[dE(eu  (m+ (y  m) + (d+ ex)) jeu = u; ey = y)]
=Max
d
[d (u m  y + m  d)]
51
The rst order condition with regard to the investors demand leads to the follow-
ing optimal demand.
d =
1
2
(u m   (y  m)) (A1.2)
The market e¢ ciency condition suggests that an assets price is the markets expec-
tion of the assets value, conditional upon all information such that p = E
eujey; eD.
Combined with eq.(A1.2), the market e¢ ciency condition yields:
p = E
eujey; eD = m+ 42n+ t
42n+ t+ 42h

(y  m)+

2t
42n+ t+ 42h

D (A1.3)
From eq.(A1.1) and eq.(A1.3),  and  are calculated as  =
n
h+ n
and  =
1
2
r
t
h+ n
.
Therefore, the equilibrium price is solved as in the following eq.(A1.4).
ep = m+ n
h+ n
(ey  m) + 1
2
r
t
h+ n
eD (A1.4)
When there are N identical informed investors instead of one informed investor,
each informed chooses d to maximize his or her expected prot, expecting other
informed investors would choose bd.
Max
d
[dE (eu  epjeu = u; ey = y)]
=Max
d
[dE(eu  (m+ (y  m) + (Nd+Mex)) jeu = u; ey = y)]
=Max
d
h
d

u m  y + m  

d+ (N   1)bd+ xi
52
The rst order condition with regard to the investors demand leads to the follow-
ing optimal demand.
d =
1
2

u m   (y  m)  (N   1)bd
Since informed investors are identical, d = bd: Therefore,
d =
1
(N + 1)
(u m   (y  m)) (A1.5)
Combined with eq.(A1.1) and eq.(A1.5), the market e¢ ciency condition p =
E
eujey; eD yields:
 =
n
h+ n
and  =
p
Nt
(1 +N)
r
1
h+ n
:
Therefore, the equilibrium price with N informed investors is solved as in the
following eq.(A1.6).
ep = m+ n
h+ n
(ey  m) + pNt
(1 +N)
r
1
h+ n
eD (A1.6)
A.2. Portfolio lambda
Let V the variance-covariance matrix of a portfolio. Let e denote a vector of ones
such that e =

1 1 :::: 1
T
. The vector of optimal weights w that minimizes
the portfolio variance solves the following problem.
w = argmin
w
 
wTV w

;
subject to wT e = e.
With the Lagrangian multiplier , the problem becomes:
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Min
w
[g (w; )] =Min
w

wTV w + 
 
1 wT e
The rst order condition with regard to the vecotor of weights yields:
@g
@w
= 2V w   e = 0, w = 
2
V  1e
From the constraint that the sum of weights is one, we get
wT e =


2
V  1e
T
e =

2
eTV  1e = 1,  = 2
eTV  1e
Combined with the rst order condition, the vector of optimal weights is solved
as the following eq.(A2.1).
w =
1
eTV  1e
V  1e (A2.1)
Therefore, the overall uncertainty of the optimaly weighted portfolio is cacluated
as the following eq.(A2.2).
wTV w =
1
(eTV  1e)2
eTV  1V V  1e =
1
eTV  1e
(A2.2)
, which is equivalant to
1
h+ n
of a single asset. Therefore, portfolio-level lambda
pf is calculated as
pf =
p
Npf tpf
(1 +Npf )
r
1
eTV  1e
(A2.3)
,where Npf is the number of informed traders trading the portfolio, tpf is the
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precision of noise trading.
A.3 The number of assets in the portfolio
Let VJ denote the optimally weighted portfolios uncertainty dened as in eq.(A2.2)
constructed with J assets.
Assume a portfolio with (J + 1) assets is constructed by adding one more asset
to the portfolio with J assets. VJ+1 is written as the following.1
VJ+1 =
264 VJ b
bT vJ+1
375, where b =  Cov(eu1; euJ+1jy) :::: Cov(euJ ; euJ+1jy) T
and vJ+1 = V ar(euJ+1jy),where y is a vector of disclosed values of J + 1 assets.
Let k denote the Schur complement k = vJ+1   bTV  1J b: Since both VJ and VJ+1
are positive-denite, k is also positive. Using k, the inverse of VJ+1 is written as the
following.
V  1J+1 =
264 VJ b
bT vJ+1
375
 1
=
264 V  1J + 1kV  1J bbT  V  1J T  1kV  1J b
 1
k
bT
 
V  1J
T 1
k
375 (A3.1)
Let P (VJ) denote the precision of the optimally weighted portfolio, which is equiv-
alent to the inverse of VJ . Then P (V ) = eTV  1J e: Let IP(J;J+1) denote the incremental
portfolio precision when an asset is added to the portfolio with J assets.
IP(J;J+1) = P (VJ+1)  P (VJ) = eTV  1J+1e  eTV  1J e (A3.2)
1Let XN denote a portfolio-level variable X when the number of asset of the portfolio is N:
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From Eq (A3.1) and Eq.(A3.2),
IP(J;J+1) =
1
k
eTV  1J bb
T
 
V  1J
T
e  2
k
eTV  1J b+
1
k
=
 
eTV  1J b  1
2
vJ+1   bTV  1J b
 0
Therefore, as the number of assets in a portfolio increases, the uncertainty about
the portfolio value decreases.
A.4 Increase in uncertainly about an individual asset
IP(1;2) = P (V2)  P (V1);
where V1 = v1, V2 =
264 v1 b
bT v2
375 and  pv1v2 < b < pv1v2:
Then,
@
@v2
IP(1;2) =
@
@v2

b2   2bv1 + v21
v21v2   b2v1

 0:
Therefore, as the uncertainty about each assets value increases, the uncertainty
about the portfolio value increases.
A.5 Covariances among asset values
V1 = v1 and V2 =
264 v1 b
bT v2
375 ;where  pv1v2 < b < pv1v2:
The incremental precision is IP(1;2) =

b
v1
  1
2
v2   b
2
v1
:
@
@b
IP(1;2) =
@
@b

b
v1
  1
2
v2   b
2
v1
=
  2
v21
(b  v1) (b  v2)
v2   b
2
v1
2
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() @
@b
IP(1;2) > 0 if min(v1; v2) < b < max(v1; v2) and
@
@b
IP(1;2) < 0,otherwise.
Since min(v1; v2) <
p
v1v2 < max(v1; v2),
@
@b
IP(1;2)  0; if  pv1v2 < b  min(v1; v2) and
@
@b
IP(1;2) > 0; if min(v1; v2) < b <
p
v1v2
Therefore, the uncertainty about the portfolio value is small when covariances
among assets are negative or very small. The result implies that the more diversied
a portfolio, the larger the uncertainty of the portfolio value. Generalization of A.5
for J + 1 asset portfolio is as follows.
The uncertainty about J+1 asset portfolio value is denoted by VJ+1 =
264 VJ b
bT vJ+1
375 ;
where b =

b1 b2 :::: bJ
T
.
From Eq.(A3.2),
@
@bj
IP(J;J+1) = 2
 
eTV  1J b  1
 
vJ+1   bTV  1J b
 heTV  1J j + 2  eTV  1J b  1 bTV  1J ji :
Let  = eT b:Then,
@
@
IP(J;J+1) =
JP
j=1
@
@bj
IP(J;J+1) =
4
k
(t  1)

t2   t+ p
2

;
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where
0BBBB@
t = eTV  1J b
k = vJ+1   bTV  1J b > 0
p = eTV  1J e > 0
1CCCCA :
Therefore,
(a) When eTV  1J e 
1
2
:
@IP(1;2)
@
 0; if eTV  1J b  1
@IP(1;2)
@
> 0; if eTV  1J b > 1
(b) When 0 < eTV  1J e <
1
2
:
@IP(1;2)
@
 0;
if
1
2
+
1
2
q
1  2  eTV  1J e  eTV  1J b  1 or eTV  1J b  12   12q1  2  eTV  1J e
@IP(1;2)
@
> 0;
if eTV  1J b > 1 or
1
2
  1
2
q
1  2  eTV  1J e < eTV  1J b < 12 + 12q1  2  eTV  1J e:
A.6 Dispersion of elements of b on incremental precision
In A.5, the magnitude of covariances is assumed to represent the extent to which
a portfolio is diversied. As an additional measure of diversication, I examine the
dispersion of covariances among asset values.
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Let V2 =
264 v b
b v
375, where v1 > v2
and let V3 =
266664
v b b+ "
b v b  "
b+ " b  " v
377775 ;where "  0;
264 b+ "
b  "
375 = be + " and
 =
264 1
 1
375 :
The incremental precision is IP(2;3) = P (V3)  P (V2)
= eTV  13 e  eTV  12 e =

2b
v + b
  1
2
v   2b
2
v + b
  2"
2
v   b
Therefore,
@IP(2;3)
@"
=
@
@"
0BBB@

2b
v + b
  1
2
v   2b
2
v + b
  2"
2
v   b
1CCCA =
4"

2b
v + b
  1
2

v   2b
2
v + b
  2"
2
v   b
2 > 0
The result also implies that the more diversied a portfolio, the larger the uncer-
tainty of the portfolio value.
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Table 1: LAMBDAs of ETFs in the sample and ETFs excluded from the sample 
   SAMPLE NOT IN SAMPLE 
      N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
BROAD MARKET  4667 0.022 0.049 0.000 0.011 1.968 4588 0.050 0.122 0.000 0.016 3.508 
 BLEND  1744 0.023 0.069 0.000 0.010 1.968 2193 0.050 0.134 0.000 0.014 3.508 
  Large-cap 841 0.017 0.028 0.000 0.008 0.322 1511 0.041 0.125 0.000 0.013 3.508 
  Mid-cap 400 0.023 0.102 0.000 0.008 1.968 317 0.063 0.155 0.000 0.023 2.179 
  Small-cap 467 0.030 0.075 0.000 0.014 1.318 64 0.157 0.237 0.000 0.079 1.341 
  Multi-cap 36 0.083 0.138 0.001 0.034 0.661 301 0.058 0.108 0.000 0.020 1.054 
 GROWTH  1321 0.023 0.036 0.000 0.013 0.446 681 0.048 0.114 0.000 0.019 2.179 
  Large-cap 479 0.020 0.039 0.000 0.010 0.327 382 0.041 0.080 0.000 0.017 1.072 
  Mid-cap 447 0.027 0.037 0.000 0.016 0.446 49 0.075 0.035 0.018 0.069 0.154 
  Small-cap 336 0.022 0.031 0.000 0.013 0.278 68 0.029 0.037 0.000 0.014 0.201 
  Multi-cap 59 0.029 0.034 0.000 0.014 0.149 182 0.061 0.184 0.001 0.015 2.179 
 VALUE  1602 0.019 0.029 0.000 0.011 0.398 1714 0.051 0.108 0.000 0.017 1.282 
  Large-cap 798 0.017 0.025 0.000 0.011 0.334 1408 0.047 0.102 0.000 0.016 1.282 
  Mid-cap 411 0.020 0.036 0.000 0.010 0.398 220 0.073 0.142 0.001 0.030 1.212 
  Small-cap 350 0.021 0.026 0.000 0.013 0.240 40 0.090 0.141 0.000 0.042 0.745 
  Multi-cap 43 0.020 0.025 0.000 0.014 0.161 46 0.014 0.015 0.001 0.009 0.078 
 large-cap  2118 0.018 0.030 0.000 0.010 0.334 3301 0.044 0.111 0.000 0.015 3.508 
 mid-cap  1258 0.023 0.065 0.000 0.012 1.968 586 0.068 0.144 0.000 0.028 2.179 
 small-cap  1153 0.025 0.053 0.000 0.018 1.318 529 0.091 0.170 0.000 0.015 1.341 
  multi-cap   138 0.040 0.079 0.000 0.013 0.661 172 0.055 0.136 0.000 0.030 2.179 
      N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
SECTOR  4316 0.026 0.066 0.000 0.012 1.968 1602 0.074 0.173 0.000 0.015 2.169 
 Commodity  3 0.065 0.060 0.013 0.052 0.130 5 0.976 0.502 0.583 0.659 1.558 
 Construction  35 0.033 0.021 0.007 0.029 0.084        
 Consumer discretionary 224 0.022 0.027 0.000 0.012 0.178 78 0.050 0.182 0.000 0.007 1.369 
 Consumer goods 89 0.025 0.044 0.000 0.007 0.230        
 Consumer service 88 0.032 0.052 0.000 0.012 0.332 42 0.121 0.056 0.019 0.119 0.262 
 Consumer staples 134 0.013 0.021 0.000 0.007 0.171 1 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 Defense  20 0.078 0.123 0.000 0.015 0.398 13 0.222 0.104 0.103 0.192 0.417 
 Energy  411 0.025 0.032 0.000 0.015 0.319 98 0.076 0.224 0.001 0.008 1.704 
 Financial  507 0.027 0.090 0.000 0.016 1.968 214 0.186 0.227 0.000 0.107 1.395 
 Food  20 0.015 0.014 0.000 0.015 0.050        
 Healthcare  516 0.013 0.017 0.000 0.008 0.172 190 0.031 0.106 0.000 0.007 1.212 
 Home builders  37 0.048 0.090 0.007 0.015 0.398        
 Industrial  239 0.024 0.043 0.000 0.011 0.327 30 0.157 0.407 0.004 0.034 2.169 
 MISC  11 0.167 0.099 0.034 0.169 0.332 1 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Materials  25 0.163 0.387 0.000 0.064 1.968 22 0.027 0.034 0.001 0.014 0.121 
 Natural resources 344 0.021 0.024 0.000 0.012 0.162 1 0.001 . 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 Real estate  347 0.027 0.049 0.000 0.012 0.446 181 0.061 0.112 0.003 0.021 1.072 
 Retail  29 0.018 0.011 0.001 0.012 0.051        
 Tech  748 0.033 0.083 0.000 0.014 1.374 472 0.061 0.146 0.000 0.014 1.453 
 Telecom  209 0.026 0.084 0.000 0.011 1.151 170 0.017 0.021 0.000 0.010 0.121 
 Transportation  44 0.014 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.054        
  Utilities   236 0.015 0.027 0.000 0.008 0.341 84 0.016 0.022 0.000 0.008 0.107 
US   8983 0.024 0.058 0.000 0.011 1.968 1813 0.080 0.174 0.000 0.019 2.179 
NON-US               4377 0.046 0.118 0.000 0.015 3.508 
This table provides the average LAMBDA of ETFs grouped by size, growth, or industry. LAMBDA (in % of price) is the adverse selection component (λ) 
of bid-ask spreads estimated per month with the method by Madhavan et al. [1997], modified by Armstrong et al. [2009]. Observations with negative 
LAMBDAs or with ones larger than 100% are excluded from the calculation. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Firm-quarter observations of levels variables 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
LAMBDA 152,151 0.159 0.331 0.000 0.044 4.093 
ETF_%HLD 152,151 0.013 0.017 0.000 0.007 0.284 
MFID_%HLD 152,151 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.028 
MFAM_%HLD 152,151 0.096 0.095 0.000 0.072 0.398 
SIZE 152,151 2,195.80 6,472.36 1.77 305.56 60,667.13 
BTM 152,151 0.761 0.372 0.089 0.762 2.694 
VOLUME 152,151 -6.052 1.717 -12.365 -5.636 -3.042 
STDRET 152,151 17.124 3.321 0.811 16.848 34.157 
ABS_ABNRET 152,151 0.168 0.177 0.000 0.115 1.960 
PRICE 152,151 20.17 18.68 0.19 15.15 121.38 
ANALYST 152,151 4.840 6.050 0.000 3.000 29.000 
INST_% 152,151 0.449 0.335 0.000 0.439 1.000 
INST_N 152,151 94.23 126.92 0.00 51.00 842.00 
PST 152,151 0.723 0.263 0.000 0.808 1.000 
LAMBDA_MKT 152,151 0.165 0.102 0.078 0.108 0.445 
LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse selection component (λ) of bid-ask spreads estimated per month with 
the method by Madhavan et al. [1997], modified by Armstrong et al. [2009]. Observations with 
negative values or larger than 100(%) of LAMBDA are excluded from the sample. ETF_%HLD is 
the percentage of shares held by any of the U.S. equity ETFs, calculated with Thomson holdings data 
(S12). The holding data are reported each month or quarter. MFID_%HLD is the percentage of shares 
held by U.S. equity index mutual funds, calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). The holding 
data are reported each month or quarter. MFAM_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by actively 
managed U.S. equity mutual funds. All non-ETF, non-index, U.S. equity mutual funds in Thomson 
holdings data (S12) are categorized as actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. The holding data 
are reported each month or quarter. ETF_%HLD, MFID_%HLD, and MFAM_%HLD are 
calculated daily and averaged by quarter. SIZE is the log of one plus market value (CRSP prc * 
shrout). Tabulated are unlogged values of SIZE in millions. BTM is the book-to-market assets ratio 
calculated as (Compustat ATQ/(ATQ -Compustat CEQQ + Market Value))) on the quarter end date. 
VOLUME is the turnover calculated as the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP 
trading volume divided by one plus the number of shares outstanding. STDRET is the annualized 
time-series standard deviation of daily returns (CRSP ret), calculated each quarter. ABS_ABNRET is 
the absolute abnormal cumulative returns in each quarter. PRICE is the log of one plus the quarterly 
average of daily CRSP prices. Tabulated are the unlogged values of PRICE. ANALYST is the log of 
one plus the quarterly average number of analysts following counted from I/B/E/S. Tabulated are the 
unlogged values of ANALYST. INST_% is the quarterly % of institutional ownership from Thomson 
Financial Spectrum. INST_N is the log of one plus the quarterly number of institutional owners from 
Thomson Financial Spectrum. Tabulated are the unlogged values of INST_N. PST is the % of small 
trades (defined as trades smaller than $5,000), calculated with the TAQ intraday trade dataset. PST is 
calculated daily and averaged by quarter. LAMBDA_MKT is the average LAMBDA of all stocks in 
the sample. All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Panel B: Firm-quarter observations of change variables over one-quarter pre- & post-
periods 
No. QTRs: 1       
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
D_LAMBDA 18,202 -0.001 0.014 -0.072 0.000 0.054 
D_ETF_%HLD 18,202 0.004 0.006 -0.015 0.003 0.033 
D_MFID_%HLD 18,202 0.000 0.002 -0.007 0.000 0.010 
D_MFAM_%HLD 18,202 0.000 0.035 -0.110 0.000 0.108 
D_SIZE 18,202 0.063 0.238 -0.762 0.057 0.796 
D_BTM 18,202 -0.002 0.082 -0.268 -0.001 0.290 
D_VOLUME 18,202 0.080 0.402 -0.999 0.068 1.309 
D_STDRET 18,202 0.112 3.629 -8.972 0.078 9.383 
D_ABS_ABNRET 18,202 -0.005 0.150 -0.518 -0.002 0.498 
D_PRICE 18,202 0.022 0.223 -0.768 0.031 0.627 
D_ANALYST 18,202 0.045 0.264 -0.693 0.000 1.099 
D_INST_% 18,202 0.027 0.082 -0.203 0.016 0.362 
D_INST_N 18,202 0.057 0.180 -0.330 0.033 1.079 
D_PST 18,202 0.008 0.133 -0.533 0.005 0.598 
D_LAMBDA_MKT 18,202 -0.004 0.029 -0.353 0.005 0.038 
POST_SIZE 18,202 14.24 1.57 11.16 14.02 18.58 
POST_BTM 18,202 0.652 0.262 0.132 0.663 1.334 
POST_ANALYST 18,202 2.020 0.829 0.000 2.079 3.497 
POST_INST_% 18,202 0.691 0.239 0.000 0.739 1.000 
POST_INST_N 18,202 4.957 0.856 0.000 4.934 7.016 
STK_DVF1 18,202 0.895 0.306 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STK_DVF2 18,202 0.830 0.375 0.000 1.000 1.000 
D_Xs refer to the change of variables calculated over one quarter pre- and post-periods surrounding 
quarters when an ETF is newly introduced. Let t=0 be the event quarter and X(t) a variable for a period 
that is t quarters before and after the event period. D_X is calculated as  ∑∑
−
−==
−
1
1
)(1)(1
kt
k
t
tX
k
tX
k
,where 
k=1. The sample consists of firm-quarter observations with both (t-1) and (t+1) quarters available. 
STK_DVF1 and STK_DVF2 are calculated from the ETF-level variables, ETF_DVF1 and 
ETF_DVF2. ETF_DVF1 is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF, and 1 otherwise. ETF_DVF2 is 0(1) if an 
ETF is ranked in the lower (higher) 50% of the factor score, calculated with the diversification score, 
the number of holding stocks, and the average weights of holding stocks. The diversification score is 0 
if an ETF is a sector ETF, 1 if an ETF duplicates an index based on size and growth, 2 if an ETF 
duplicates an index based either on size or growth, and 3 if an ETF duplicates a broad market index. 
For firms that are included in new ETFs, ETF_DVF1 and ETF_DVF2 of these new ETFs are 
weighted by the number of shares held by these ETFs. STK_DVF1 (STK_DVF2) is 0 if the value-
weighted ETF_DVF1 (ETF_DVF2) for the firm-quarter is closer to 0, and 1 if it is closer to 1. 
Tabulated in panel B are STK_DVF1, STK_DVF2, and D_Xs calculated for one quarter periods for 
the following variables. LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse selection component (λ) of bid-ask spreads 
estimated per month with the method by Madhavan et al. [1997], modified by Armstrong et al. [2009]. 
Observations with negative values or larger than 100(%) of LAMBDA are excluded from the sample. 
ETF_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by any of the U.S. equity ETFs calculated with 
Thomson holdings data (S12). MFID_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by U.S. equity index 
mutual funds calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). MFAM_%HLD is the percentage of 
shares held by actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. All non-ETF, non-index, U.S. equity 
mutual funds in Thomson holdings data (S12) are categorized as actively managed U.S. equity mutual 
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funds. ETF_%HLD, MFID_%HLD, and MFAM_%HLD are calculated daily and averaged by 
quarter. SIZE is the log of one plus market value (CRSP prc * shrout). BTM is the book-to-market 
assets ratio calculated as (Compustat ATQ/(ATQ -Compustat CEQQ + Market Value))) on the quarter 
end date. VOLUME it the turnover calculated as the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily 
CRSP trading volume divided by one plus the number of shares outstanding. STDRET is the 
annualized time-series standard deviation of daily returns (CRSP ret), calculated each quarter. 
ABS_ABNRET is the absolute abnormal cumulative returns in each quarter. PRICE is the log of one 
plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP prices. ANALYST is the log of one plus the quarterly 
average number of analysts following counted from I/B/E/S. INST_% is the quarterly % of 
institutional ownership from Thomson Financial Spectrum. INST_N is the log of one plus the 
quarterly number of institutional owners from Thomson Financial Spectrum. PST is the % of small 
trades (defined as trades smaller than $5,000) calculated with the TAQ intraday trade dataset. PST is 
calculated daily and averaged by quarter. LAMBDA_MKT is the average LAMBDA of all stocks in 
the sample. All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
 
Panel C: Firm-quarter observations of change variables over two, three, and four-
quarter pre- & post-periods 
No. QTRs: 2       
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
D_LAMBDA 17,783 -0.002 0.016 -0.080 0.000 0.088 
D_ETF_%HLD 17,783 0.006 0.007 -0.012 0.005 0.037 
       
No. QTRs: 3             
D_LAMBDA 17,379 -0.003 0.020 -0.103 0.000 0.103 
D_ETF_%HLD 17,379 0.007 0.008 -0.011 0.006 0.041 
       
No. QTRs: 4       
D_LAMBDA 16,963 -0.005 0.023 -0.125 -0.001 0.106 
D_ETF_%HLD 16,963 0.009 0.008 -0.010 0.007 0.044 
D_Xs refer to the change of variables calculated over one to four quarters of pre- and post-periods 
surrounding quarters when an ETF is newly introduced. Let t=0 be the event quarter and X(t) a variable 
for a period that is t quarters before and after the event period. D_X is calculated as  
∑∑
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,where k=2,..,4. Tabulated in panel C are D_Xs calculated for two to four quarter 
periods for LAMBDA and ETF_%HLD. The sample used for the first two rows consists of firm-
quarter observations with (t-2), (t-1), (t+1), and (t+2) quarters available. The sample used for the next 
two rows consists of firm-quarter observations with (t-3), (t-2), (t-1), (t+1), (t+2), and (t+3) quarters 
available. The sample used for the last two rows consists of firm-quarter observations with (t-4), (t-3), 
(t-2), (t-1), (t+1), (t+2), (t+3), and (t+4) quarters available. LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse selection 
component (λ) of bid-ask spreads estimated per month with the method by Madhavan et al. [1997], 
modified by Armstrong et al. [2009]. Observations with negative values or larger than 100(%) of 
LAMBDA are excluded from the sample. ETF_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by any of the 
U.S. equity ETFs calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). The holding data are reported each 
month or quarter. All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Panel D: ETF-month observations 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
ETF_LAMBDA 8,983 0.024 0.058 0.000 0.011 1.968 
STK_LAMBDA 8,983 0.015 0.011 0.003 0.012 0.089 
ETF_SIZE 8,983 2,012.69 6,303.28 1.12 270.66 96,723.11 
ETF_VOLUME 8,983 -3.996 1.134 -8.690 -4.195 0.684 
ETF_STDRET 8,981 0.244 0.189 0.000 0.185 1.472 
ETF_ABS_ABNRET 8,983 0.023 0.027 0.000 0.014 0.344 
ETF_PRICE 8,983 54.95 32.57 1.80 51.85 205.02 
ETF_INST_% 8,983 0.380 0.276 0.000 0.328 1.000 
ETF_INST_N 8,983 54.17 72.61 0.00 25.00 575.00 
STK_IDIO 8,983 0.016 0.007 0.005 0.014 0.061 
ETF_DVF1 8,983 0.520 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ETF_DVF2 8,983 0.492 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ETF_PST 8,983 0.221 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.968 
ETF_LAMBDA_MKT 8,983 0.025 0.019 0.004 0.022 0.084 
ETF_LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse selection component (λ) of ETF bid-ask spreads estimated per 
month with the method by Madhavan et al. [1997] modified by Armstrong et al. [2009]. Observations 
with negative values or larger than 100(%) of ETF_LAMBDA are excluded from the sample. 
STK_LAMBDA is the value-weighted average of holding stocks’ lambdas of ETFs. ETF_SIZE the 
log of one plus ETF market value, calculated with the sum of stocks’ daily market values (CRSP prc * 
shrout). Tabulated are unlogged values of ETF_SIZE in millions. ETF_VOLUME it the turnover of 
an ETF calculated as the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP trading volume divided 
by one plus the number of shares outstanding. ETF_STDRET is the annualized time-series standard 
deviation of daily returns, calculated each quarter. ETF_ABS_ABNRET is the absolute abnormal 
cumulative returns in each quarter. ETF_PRICE is the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily 
CRSP prices of an ETF. Tabulated are the unlogged values of ETF_PRICE. ETF_INST_% is the 
quarterly % of institutional ownership of an ETF from Thomson Financial Spectrum. ETF_INST_N is 
the log of one plus the quarterly number of institutional owners of an ETF from Thomson Financial 
Spectrum. Tabulated are the unlogged values of ETF_INST_N. STK_IDIO is the value-weighted 
average of holding stocks’ idiosyncratic volatilities. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the 
quarterly standard deviation of residuals of daily cross-sectional Fama-French 3-factor regressions. At 
least 15 daily observations are required to calculate the standard deviation for each quarter. 
ETF_DVF1 is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF, and 1 otherwise. ETF_DVF2 is 0(1) if an ETF is ranked in 
the lower (higher) 50% of the factor score, calculated with the diversification score, the number of 
holding stocks, and the average weights of holding stocks. The diversification score is 0 if an ETF is a 
sector ETF, 1 if an ETF duplicates an index based on size and growth, 2 if an ETF duplicates an index 
based either on size or growth, and 3 if an ETF duplicates a broad market index. ETF_PST is the % of 
small trades, calculated with intraday trade data of ETFs. ETF_LAMBDA_MKT is the average of 
ETF_LAMBDA, calculated with all sample ETFs. All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlations 
Panel A: Firm-quarter observations 
 ETF _%HLD 
MFID 
_%HLD 
MFAM 
_%HLD SIZE BTM 
VOL 
UME 
STD 
RET 
ABS_ 
ABN 
RET 
PRICE ANA LYST 
INST 
_% 
INST 
_N PST 
LAM 
BDA 
_MKT 
LAMBDA -0.27 -0.22 -0.30 -0.55 0.19 -0.53 0.09 0.14 -0.44 -0.40 -0.38 -0.41 0.26 0.29 
ETF_%HLD  0.42 0.47 0.43 -0.14 0.44 -0.02 -0.10 0.36 0.50 0.61 0.56 -0.12 -0.14 
MFID_%HLD   0.45 0.60 -0.13 0.32 -0.03 -0.14 0.40 0.56 0.47 0.58 -0.43 -0.02 
MFAM_%HLD    0.52 -0.19 0.43 0.00 -0.12 0.44 0.65 0.78 0.66 -0.31 -0.04 
SIZE     -0.27 0.53 -0.04 -0.23 0.73 0.73 0.56 0.71 -0.63 -0.16 
BTM      -0.26 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.22 -0.11 -0.21 0.07 0.17 
VOLUME       -0.09 0.11 0.28 0.55 0.54 0.50 -0.18 -0.14 
STDRET        0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 
ABS_ABNRET         -0.33 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 0.21 0.13 
PRICE          0.50 0.50 0.55 -0.74 -0.18 
ANALYST           0.70 0.80 -0.38 -0.08 
INST_%            0.80 -0.30 -0.12 
INST_N             -0.39 -0.11 
PST              0.03 
LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse selection component (λ) of bid-ask spreads estimated per month with the method by Madhavan et al. [1997], modified by Armstrong et al. 
[2009]. Observations with negative values or larger than 100(%) of LAMBDA are excluded from the sample. ETF_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by any of the U.S. 
equity ETFs, calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). The holding data are reported each month or quarter. MFID_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by U.S. 
equity index mutual funds, calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). The holding data are reported each month or quarter. MFAM_%HLD is the percentage of shares 
held by actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. All non-ETF, non-index, U.S. equity mutual funds in Thomson holdings data (S12) are categorized as actively managed 
U.S. equity mutual funds. The holding data are reported each month or quarter. ETF_%HLD, MFID_%HLD, and MFAM_%HLD are calculated daily and averaged by 
quarter. SIZE is the log of one plus market value (CRSP prc * shrout). BTM is the book-to-market assets ratio calculated as (Compustat ATQ/(ATQ -Compustat CEQQ + 
Market Value))) on the quarter end date. VOLUME is the turnover calculated as the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP trading volume divided by one plus 
the number of shares outstanding. STDRET is the annualized time-series standard deviation of daily returns (CRSP ret), calculated each quarter. ABS_ABNRET is the 
absolute abnormal cumulative returns in each quarter. PRICE is the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP prices. ANALYST is the log of one plus the 
quarterly average number of analysts following counted from I/B/E/S. INST_% is the quarterly % of institutional ownership from Thomson Financial Spectrum. INST_N is 
the log of one plus the quarterly number of institutional owners from Thomson Financial Spectrum. PST is the % of small trades (defined as trades smaller than $5,000), 
calculated with the TAQ intraday trade dataset. PST is calculated daily and averaged by quarter. LAMBDA_MKT is the average LAMBDA of all stocks in the sample. All 
variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Panel B: Change variables over one-quarter pre- and post-periods 
 
D_ 
ETF 
_%HLD 
D_ 
MFID 
_%HLD 
D_ 
MFAM 
_%HLD 
D_ 
SIZE 
D_ 
BTM 
D_VOL 
UME 
D_STD 
RET 
D_ABS 
_ABN 
RET 
D_ 
PRICE 
D_ANA 
LYST 
D_ 
INST_% 
D_IN 
ST_N 
D_ 
PST 
D_LAM 
BDA_ 
MKT 
STK_ 
DVF1 
STK_ 
DVF2 
D_LAMBDA 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.33 0.24 -0.25 0.00 0.06 -0.28 -0.12 -0.11 -0.29 0.10 0.21 -0.06 -0.05 
D_ETF_%HLD  0.30 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.08 0.24 0.15 -0.12 0.08 -0.13 -0.05 
D_MFID_%HLD   0.20 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.11 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
D_MFAM_%HLD    0.11 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.21 0.15 0.41 0.20 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.02 
D_SIZE     -0.73 0.14 0.00 -0.11 0.85 0.16 0.20 0.54 -0.40 -0.30 0.02 0.00 
D_BTM      -0.13 -0.01 0.06 -0.68 -0.06 -0.11 -0.35 0.32 0.24 -0.04 -0.01 
D_VOLUME       0.07 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.23 0.30 -0.14 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
D_STDRET        0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 
D_ABS_ABNRET         -0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 
D_PRICE          0.10 0.26 0.46 -0.54 -0.27 0.02 0.00 
D_ANALYST           0.19 0.29 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.02 
D_INST_%            0.45 -0.11 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
D_INST_N             -0.21 -0.16 0.01 0.03 
D_PST              0.13 -0.01 0.00 
D_LAMBDA_MK
T               -0.19 -0.14 
STK_DVF1                               0.69 
D_Xs refer to the change of variables calculated over one to four quarters of pre- and post-periods surrounding quarters when an ETF is newly introduced. Let t=0 be the 
event quarter and X(t) denote a variable for a period that is t quarters before and after the event period. D_X is calculated as  ∑∑
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,where k=1,…,4. 
STK_DVF1 and STK_DVF2 are calculated from the ETF-level variables, ETF_DVF1 and ETF_DVF2. ETF_DVF1 is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF, and 1 otherwise. 
ETF_DVF2 is 0(1) if an ETF is ranked in the lower (higher) 50% of the factor score, calculated with the diversification score, the number of holding stocks, and the average 
weights of holding stocks. The diversification score is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF, 1 if an ETF duplicates an index based on size and growth, 2 if an ETF duplicates an index 
based either on size or growth, and 3 if an ETF duplicates a broad market index. For firms that are included in new ETFs, ETF_DVF1 and ETF_DVF2 of these new ETFs are 
weighted by the number of shares held by these ETFs. STK_DVF1 (STK_DVF2) is 0 if the value-weighted ETF_DVF1 (ETF_DVF2) for the firm-quarter is closer to 0, and 
1 if it is closer to 1.All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Panel C: ETF-month observations 
ETF_LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse selection component (λ) of ETF bid-ask spreads estimated per month with the method by Madhavan et al. [1997] modified by 
Armstrong et al. [2009]. Observations with negative values or larger than 100(%) of ETF_LAMBDA are excluded from the sample. STK_LAMBDA is the value-weighted 
average of holding stocks’ lambdas of ETFs.  ETF_SIZE the log of one plus ETF market value, calculated with the sum of stocks’ daily market values (CRSP prc * shrout). 
ETF_VOLUME it the turnover of an ETF calculated as the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP trading volume divided by one plus the number of shares 
outstanding. ETF_STDRET is the annualized time-series standard deviation of daily returns, calculated each quarter. ETF_ABS_ABNRET is the absolute abnormal 
cumulative returns in each quarter. ETF_PRICE is the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP prices of an ETF. ETF_INST_% is the quarterly % of 
institutional ownership of an ETF from Thomson Financial Spectrum. ETF_INST_N is the log of one plus the quarterly number of institutional owners of an ETF from 
Thomson Financial Spectrum. STK_IDIO is the value-weighted average of holding stocks’ idiosyncratic volatilities. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the quarterly 
standard deviation of residuals of daily cross-sectional Fama-French 3-factor regressions. At least 15 daily observations are required to calculate the standard deviation for 
each quarter. ETF_DVF1 is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF, and 1 otherwise. ETF_DVF2 is 0(1) if an ETF is ranked in the lower (higher) 50% of the factor score, calculated 
with the diversification score, the number of holding stocks, and the average weights of holding stocks. The diversification score is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF, 1 if an ETF 
duplicates an index based on size and growth, 2 if an ETF duplicates an index based either on size or growth, and 3 if an ETF duplicates a broad market index. ETF_PST is 
the % of small trades, calculated with intraday trade data of ETFs. ETF_LAMBDA_MKT is the average of ETF_LAMBDA, calculated with all sample ETFs. All variables 
are winsorized at 1%. 
 
 
 
STK_ 
LAM 
BDA 
ETF_ 
SIZE 
ETF_ 
VOL 
UME 
ETF_ 
STD 
RET 
ETF_ 
ABS_ 
ABNRET 
ETF_ 
PRICE 
ETF_ 
INST 
_% 
ETF_ 
INST 
_N 
STK_ 
IDIO 
ETF_ 
DVF1 
ETF_ 
DVF2 
ETF_ 
PST 
ETF_L 
AMBD 
A_MKT 
ETF_LAMBDA 0.21 -0.32 0.01 0.28 0.14 -0.24 -0.03 -0.24 0.29 -0.03 -0.02 0.17 0.30 
STK_LAMBDA  -0.17 0.15 0.61 0.25 -0.20 0.05 -0.02 0.77 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.52 
ETF_SIZE   0.10 -0.17 -0.14 0.54 0.26 0.79 -0.23 0.21 0.19 -0.37 -0.20 
ETF_VOLUME    0.28 0.23 0.08 0.52 0.22 0.23 -0.27 -0.23 0.03 0.17 
ETF_STDRET     0.40 -0.30 0.15 0.02 0.84 -0.14 -0.09 0.34 0.75 
ETF_ABS_ABNRET      -0.18 0.12 -0.04 0.40 -0.35 -0.30 0.21 0.27 
ETF_PRICE       0.02 0.36 -0.31 0.23 0.30 -0.82 -0.24 
ETF_INST_%        0.45 0.10 -0.28 -0.20 0.08 0.05 
ETF_INST_N         -0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.18 -0.02 
STK_IDIO          -0.02 0.04 0.31 0.70 
ETF_DVF1           0.79 -0.27 -0.02 
ETF_DVF2            -0.33 0.02 
ETF_PST                         0.25 
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Table 4: Regressions of Adverse Selection 
Panel A: Regression of LAMBDA on % of shares held by ETFs 
 
Pred. 
Sign Dep. Var: LAMBDA 
   1 2 3 4 
Intercept   0.268 *** 0.238 *** 0.133 ** 0.603 *** 
    (4.18)   (4.15)   (2.09)   (5.87)   
ETF_%HLD +     1.362 ** 1.217 ** 1.739 *** 
        (2.66)   (2.16)   (2.97)   
SIZE - -0.043 *** -0.042 *** -0.042 *** -0.053 *** 
    (-7.8)   (-7.84)   (-7.85)   (-8.56)   
BTM + -0.007   -0.005   -0.012 ** -0.020 *** 
    (-1.15)   (-0.88)   (-2.46)   (-3.48)   
VOLUME - -0.078 *** -0.080 *** -0.080 *** -0.078 *** 
    (-12.49)   (-12.53)   (-12.33)   (-12.47)   
STDRET + 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 
    (3.47)   (3.66)   (3.91)   (4.66)   
ABS_ABNRET + 0.114 *** 0.116 *** 0.117 *** 0.096 *** 
    (8.45)   (8.37)   (7.5)   (6.72)   
PRICE  +/- -0.054 *** -0.056 *** -0.053 *** -0.097 *** 
    (-5.12)   (-5.19)   (-4.96)   (-6.28)   
ANALYST - 0.036 *** 0.035 *** 0.034 *** 0.036 *** 
    (8.17)   (8.28)   (7.98)   (8.91)   
INST_% + 0.059 *** 0.033 *** 0.037 *** 0.043 *** 
    (4.43)   (3.13)   (3.29)   (3.95)   
INST_N - -0.012 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 *** -0.015 *** 
    (-5.52)   (-5.62)   (-6.64)   (-7.45)   
LAMBDA_MKT +         0.608 *** 0.591 *** 
            (9.77)   (10.04)   
PST -             -0.263 *** 
                (-7.53)   
R-sqr   0.437   0.440   0.445   0.461   
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of the adverse 
selection components of all Compustat firms on the percentages of shares held by ETFs. I estimate pooled regressions 
of the firm sample and report coefficients and t-statistics calculated with two-way cluster robust errors (Gow et al. 
[2009]). LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse selection component (λ) of bid-ask spreads estimated per month with the 
method by Madhavan et al. [1997], modified by Armstrong et al. [2009]. Observations with negative values or larger 
than 100(%) of LAMBDA are excluded from the sample. ETF_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by any of the 
U.S. equity ETFs, calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). The holding data are reported each month or quarter. 
SIZE is the log of one plus market value (CRSP prc * shrout). BTM is the book-to-market assets ratio calculated as 
(Compustat ATQ/(ATQ -Compustat CEQQ + Market Value))) on the quarter end date. VOLUME is the turnover 
calculated as the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP trading volume divided by one plus the number of 
shares outstanding. STDRET is the annualized time-series standard deviation of daily returns (CRSP ret), calculated 
each quarter. ABS_ABNRET is the absolute abnormal cumulative returns in each quarter. PRICE is the log of one 
plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP prices. ANALYST is the log of one plus the quarterly average number of 
analysts following counted from I/B/E/S. INST_% is the quarterly % of institutional ownership from Thomson 
Financial Spectrum. INST_N is the log of one plus the quarterly number of institutional owners from Thomson 
Financial Spectrum. LAMBDA_MKT is the average LAMBDA of all stocks in the sample. PST is the % of small 
trades (defined as trades smaller than $5,000), calculated with the TAQ intraday trade dataset. PST is calculated daily 
and averaged by quarter. All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Panel B: Regression of LAMBDA on % of shares held by mutual funds 
 Pred. Sign Dep. Var: LAMBDA 
   1 2 3 4 
Intercept   0.676 *** 0.674 *** 0.676 *** 0.635 *** 
    (6.47)   (6.52)   (6.55)   (6)   
ETF_%HLD +     1.295 ** 1.291 **     
        (2.27)   (2.26)       
MFID_%HLD + 6.111 *** 5.398 *** 5.356 ***     
    (7.71)   (7.69)   (7.7)       
ID_%HLD +             2.005 *** 
                (3.78)   
MFAM_%HLD +         0.062 * 0.075 ** 
           (1.91)   (2.14)   
SIZE - -0.062 *** -0.061 *** -0.061 *** -0.056 *** 
    (-8.84)   (-8.89)   (-8.9)   (-8.4)   
BTM + -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.021 *** -0.018 *** 
    (-4.42)   (-4.08)   (-3.74)   (-3.14)   
VOLUME - -0.074 *** -0.076 *** -0.076 *** -0.077 *** 
    (-12.44)   (-12.59)   (-12.59)   (-12.44)   
STDRET + 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 
    (4.2)   (4.53)   (4.55)   (4.56)   
ABS_ABNRET + 0.099 *** 0.099 *** 0.099 *** 0.097 *** 
    (6.92)   (6.87)   (6.87)   (6.77)   
PRICE  +/- -0.080 *** -0.086 *** -0.086 *** -0.095 *** 
    (-6.01)   (-5.91)   (-5.93)   (-6.4)   
ANALYST - 0.034 *** 0.034 *** 0.033 *** 0.034 *** 
    (8.91)   (8.98)   (8.44)   (8.59)   
INST_% + 0.066 *** 0.043 *** 0.030 *** 0.020 * 
    (5.61)   (4.06)   (2.94)   (1.86)   
INST_N - -0.019 *** -0.020 *** -0.019 *** -0.017 *** 
    (-9.33)   (-9.56)   (-9.08)   (-7.32)   
LAMBDA_MKT + 0.620 *** 0.590 *** 0.589 *** 0.579 *** 
    (10.31)   (9.82)   (9.84)   (9.83)   
PST - -0.209 *** -0.229 *** -0.229 *** -0.256 *** 
    (-7.25)   (-7.3)   (-7.32)   (-7.54)   
R-sqr   0.464   0.467   0.467   0.464   
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of the adverse 
selection components of all Compustat firms on the percentages of shares held by ETFs and the percentages of 
shares held by mutual funds. I estimate pooled regressions of the firm sample and report coefficients and t-
statistics calculated with two-way cluster robust errors (Gow et al. [2009]). LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse 
selection component (λ) of bid-ask spreads estimated per month with the method by Madhavan et al. [1997], 
modified by Armstrong et al. [2009]. Observations with negative values or larger than 100(%) of LAMBDA are 
excluded from the sample. ETF_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by any of the U.S. equity ETFs, 
calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). The holding data are reported each month or quarter. 
MFID_%HLD is the percentage of shares held by U.S. equity index mutual funds, calculated with Thomson 
holdings data (S12). The holding data are reported each month or quarter. MFAM_%HLD is the percentage of 
shares held by actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. All non-ETF, non-index, U.S. equity mutual funds in 
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Thomson holdings data (S12) are categorized as actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. The holding data are 
reported each month or quarter. ETF_%HLD, MFID_%HLD, and MFAM_%HLD are calculated daily and 
averaged by quarter. ID_%HLD is the sum of ETF_%HLD and MFID_%HLD. SIZE is the log of one plus 
market value (CRSP prc * shrout). BTM is the book-to-market assets ratio calculated as (Compustat ATQ/(ATQ -
Compustat CEQQ + Market Value))) on the quarter end date. VOLUME is the turnover calculated as the log of 
one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP trading volume divided by one plus the number of shares 
outstanding. STDRET is the annualized time-series standard deviation of daily returns (CRSP ret), calculated 
each quarter. ABS_ABNRET is the absolute abnormal cumulative returns in each quarter. PRICE is the log of 
one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP prices. ANALYST is the log of one plus the quarterly average 
number of analysts following counted from I/B/E/S. INST_% is the quarterly % of institutional ownership from 
Thomson Financial Spectrum. INST_N is the log of one plus the quarterly number of institutional owners from 
Thomson Financial Spectrum. LAMBDA_MKT is the average LAMBDA of all stocks in the sample. PST is 
the % of small trades (defined as trades smaller than $5,000), calculated with the TAQ intraday trade dataset. PST 
is calculated daily and averaged by quarter. All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Table 5: Regressions of the Change in Adverse Selection 
Panel A: Regressions of D_LAMBDA on D_ETF_%HLD and change variables 
  Dep. Var: D_LAMBDA 
 Pred.  Sign 1 QTR 2 QTR 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intercept   0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 
    (0.63)  (0.65)  (0.61)  (0.58)  (1.83)  (1.94)  (1.9)   (1.79)   
D_ETF_%HLD + 0.131 * 0.118 * 0.121 *    0.161 ** 0.140 ** 0.140 **     
    (1.82)  (1.7)  (1.71)     (2.21)  (2.03)  (2.02)       
D_MFID_%HLD +    0.170 *** 0.181 ***       0.313 *** 0.314 ***     
       (3.97)  (4.07)        (3.97)  (3.95)       
D_ID_%HLD +          0.129 **           0.164 ** 
            (2.03)            (2.47)   
D_MFAM_%HLD  +/-       -0.007 * -0.007 *       -0.001   -0.001   
          (-1.94)  (-1.86)        (-0.32)   (-0.26)   
D_SIZE - -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 *** 
    (-3.39)  (-3.37)  (-3.46)  (-3.43)  (-5.64)  (-5.65)  (-5.7)   (-5.64)   
D_BTM + -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002   -0.001   
    (-0.79)  (-0.89)  (-0.86)  (-0.85)  (-0.13)  (-0.26)  (-0.26)   (-0.21)   
D_VOLUME - -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** 
    (-7.45)  (-7.45)  (-7.46)  (-7.45)  (-5.64)  (-5.63)  (-5.63)   (-5.65)   
D_STDRET + 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000   
    (0.1)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (1.38)  (1.37)  (1.36)   (1.37)   
D_ABS_ABNRET + 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 
    (5.31)  (5.2)  (5.17)  (5.21)  (5.63)  (5.56)  (5.57)   (5.63)   
D_PRICE  +/- -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 ** -0.003 * 
   (-2.84)  (-3.11)  (-3.2)  (-3.09)  (-1.65)  (-1.95)  (-2.01)   (-1.88)   
D_ANALYST - -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** 
    (-3)  (-3.01)  (-2.98)  (-2.98)  (-2.4)  (-2.38)  (-2.32)   (-2.34)   
D_INST_% + 0.004  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.000  -0.001  -0.001   -0.001   
    (0.7)  (0.61)  (0.74)  (0.76)  (-0.05)  (-0.23)  (-0.15)   (-0.13)   
D_INST_N - -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** 
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    (-2.28)  (-2.29)  (-2.3)  (-2.3)  (-2.1)  (-2.21)  (-2.18)   (-2.14)   
D_LAMBDA_MKT + 0.062 *** 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.062 *** 0.068 ** 0.069 ** 0.069 ** 0.068 ** 
    (2.75)  (2.82)  (2.81)  (2.76)  (2.37)  (2.47)  (2.47)   (2.41)   
D_PST - -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** 
    (-3.56)  (-3.6)  (-3.6)  (-3.59)  (-2.93)  (-2.98)  (-2.99)   (-2.95)   
R-sqr   0.184   0.184  0.184  0.184  0.276  0.278  0.278   0.277   
 
Panel A (continued): Regressions of D_LAMBDA on D_ETF_%HLD and change variables  
  Dep. Var: D_LAMBDA 
 
Pred.  
Sign 3 QTR 4 QTR 
    9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Intercept   0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
    (2.87)  (3.06)  (3.01)  (2.86)   (4.13)   (4.46)  (4.29)  (4.1)  
D_ETF_%HLD + 0.216 ** 0.187 * 0.187 *     0.278 ** 0.246 ** 0.246 **    
    (2.08)  (1.91)  (1.9)      (2.2)   (2.04)  (2.03)     
D_MFID_%HLD +    0.442 *** 0.442 ***         0.491 *** 0.491 ***    
       (4.15)  (4.15)          (4.05)  (4.07)     
D_ID_%HLD +          0.222 **           0.280 ** 
            (2.36)             (2.47)  
D_MFAM_%HLD  +/-       0.003  0.003          0.001  0.001  
          (0.48)  (0.48)          (0.11)  (0.07)  
D_SIZE - -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** 
    (-6.04)  (-6.07)  (-6.07)  (-6.02)   (-6.43)   (-6.47)  (-6.47)  (-6.42)  
D_BTM + 0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000   0.001   0.000  0.000  0.000  
    (0.07)  (-0.09)  (-0.09)  (-0.02)   (0.11)   (-0.04)  (-0.04)  (0.01)  
D_VOLUME - -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** 
    (-4.76)  (-4.75)  (-4.74)  (-4.79)   (-4.52)   (-4.51)  (-4.51)  (-4.56)  
D_STDRET + 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 
    (2.03)  (2.03)  (2.04)  (2.04)   (2.06)   (2.09)  (2.09)  (2.07)  
D_ABS_ABNRET + 0.027 *** 0.026 *** 0.026 *** 0.026 *** 0.042 *** 0.042 *** 0.042 *** 0.042 *** 
    (4.35)  (4.32)  (4.32)  (4.34)   (5.43)   (5.44)  (5.43)  (5.45)  
D_PRICE  +/- -0.003 ** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 ** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** 
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   (-2.32)  (-2.79)  (-2.85)  (-2.63)   (-2.38)   (-2.77)  (-2.8)  (-2.61)  
D_ANALYST - -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** 
    (-2.74)  (-2.7)  (-2.67)  (-2.69)   (-2.55)   (-2.47)  (-2.39)  (-2.41)  
D_INST_% + -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003   0.002   0.002  0.001  0.001  
    (-0.44)  (-0.6)  (-0.64)  (-0.65)   (0.35)   (0.31)  (0.21)  (0.18)  
D_INST_N - -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** 
    (-1.96)  (-2.19)  (-2.13)  (-2)   (-1.99)   (-2.25)  (-2.19)  (-2.03)  
D_LAMBDA_MKT + 0.091 *** 0.092 *** 0.092 *** 0.091 *** 0.102 *** 0.103 *** 0.103 *** 0.102 *** 
    (2.77)  (2.87)  (2.87)  (2.81)   (2.77)   (2.84)  (2.84)  (2.81)  
D_PST - -0.015 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.021 ** -0.021 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 ** 
    (-2.99)  (-3.06)  (-3.06)  (-3)   (-2.56)   (-2.61)  (-2.62)  (-2.57)  
R-sqr   0.363   0.366  0.366  0.365   0.438   0.441  0.441  0.441  
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of the change in the adverse selection components of 
Compustat firms on the change in the percentages of those firms’ shares that are held by ETFs. I estimate pooled regressions of the firm sample and report 
coefficients and t-statistics calculated with two-way cluster robust errors (Gow et al. [2009]). D_Xs refer to the change of variables calculated over one to four 
quarters of pre- and post-periods surrounding quarters when an ETF is newly introduced. Let t=0 be the event quarter and X(t) denote a variable for a period 
that is t quarters before and after the event period. D_X is calculated as  ∑∑
−
−==
−
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1
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,where k=1,…,4. All variables are winsorized at 1%. All 
variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Panel B: Regressions of D_LAMBDA on D_ETF_%HLD, change variables, and post-period firm characteristics 
 
Pred.  
Sign 1 QTR 2 QTR 3 QTR 4 QTR 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intercept   -0.013 * -0.013 * -0.019 ** -0.019 ** -0.026 ** -0.026 ** -0.037 *** -0.037 *** 
    (-1.74)  (-1.7)  (-2.09)  (-2.03)  (-2.26)  (-2.19)  (-2.71)  (-2.64)  
D_ETF_%HLD + 0.133 ** 0.120 * 0.134 *** 0.121 ** 0.158 ** 0.146 ** 0.204 ** 0.199 ** 
    (2.18)  (1.89)  (2.7)  (2.3)  (2.41)  (2.05)  (2.41)  (2.14)  
D_MFID_%HLD +    0.139 **    0.149 ***    0.144     0.059  
       (2.31)     (2.81)     (1.64)     (0.51)  
POST_SIZE - 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001 * 0.001 * 
    (-0.28)  (-0.31)  (0.47)  (0.41)  (1.11)  (1.05)  (1.86)  (1.82)  
POST_BTM + 0.002  0.002  0.003 ** 0.003 ** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 
    (1.5)  (1.5)  (2.26)  (2.26)  (2.66)  (2.66)  (3.21)  (3.21)  
D_VOLUME - -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.012 *** -0.012 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 *** 
    (-6.05)  (-6.09)  (-5.75)  (-5.76)  (-5.09)  (-5.09)  (-4.98)  (-4.97)  
D_STDRET + 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 
    (0.34)  (0.36)  (1.37)  (1.37)  (1.84)  (1.85)  (1.74)  (1.75)  
D_ABS_ABNRET + 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.028 *** 0.028 *** 0.043 *** 0.043 *** 
    (5.76)  (5.7)  (7.87)  (7.86)  (5.32)  (5.33)  (6.97)  (6.99)  
D_PRICE  +/- -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 *** -0.023 *** -0.023 *** 
   (-5.84)  (-5.88)  (-6.58)  (-6.63)  (-7.15)  (-7.22)  (-7.24)  (-7.31)  
POST_ANALYST - 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
    (0.42)  (0.42)  (0)  (0.01)  (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
POST_INST_% + 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.005  0.005  0.006 * 0.006 * 0.007 * 0.007 * 
    (2.07)  (2.04)  (1.62)  (1.6)  (1.67)  (1.65)  (1.86)  (1.85)  
POST_INST_N - 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
    (2.35)  (2.36)  (2.55)  (2.58)  (1.98)  (2)  (2.88)  (2.89)  
D_LAMBDA_MKT + 0.058 *** 0.059 *** 0.069 *** 0.069 *** 0.092 *** 0.092 *** 0.100 *** 0.100 *** 
    (3.35)  (3.42)  (3.23)  (3.28)  (3.61)  (3.64)  (3.63)  (3.65)  
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D_PST - -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 *** -0.024 *** -0.024 *** 
    (-3.89)  (-3.91)  (-3.48)  (-3.5)  (-3.73)  (-3.77)  (-3.29)  (-3.33)  
R-sqr   0.189   0.190  0.274  0.275  0.361  0.361  0.447  0.447  
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of the change in the adverse selection components of 
Compustat firms on the change in the percentages of those firms’ shares that are held by ETFs. I estimate pooled regressions of the firm sample and report 
coefficients and t-statistics calculated with two-way cluster robust errors (Gow et al. [2009]). D_Xs refer to the change of variables calculated over one to 
four quarters of pre- and post-periods surrounding quarters when an ETF is newly introduced. Let t=0 be the event quarter and X(t) denote a variable for a 
period that is t quarters before and after the event period. D_X is calculated as  ∑∑
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Table 6: Regressions of the Change in Adverse Selection on Diversification 
  Dep. Var: D_LAMBDA 
  1 QTR 2 QTR 3 QTR 4QTR 
   STK_DVF= 
 
Pred. 
Sign STK_DVF1 STK_DVF2 STK_DVF1 STK_DVF2 STK_DVF1 STK_DVF2 STK_DVF1 STK_DVF2 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intercept   0.000   0.001 ** 0.002 * 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
    (0.48)   (2.11)   (1.74)   (2.83)   (3.1)   (3.6)   (2.91)   (3.9)   
STK_DVF   0.000   -0.001   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
    (-0.11)   (-1.01)   (-0.25)   (-0.39)   (0.04)   (0.28)   (0.1)   (-0.14)   
D_ETF_%HLD   -0.001   0.026   0.042   0.070 * 0.049   0.087 * 0.038   0.062 ** 
    (-0.03)   (0.45)   (1.23)   (1.86)   (0.98)   (1.91)   (1.58)   (2.33)   
D_ETF_%HLD* STK_DVF + 0.175 * 0.155 * 0.148   0.131   0.203   0.175   0.288 * 0.284 ** 
    (1.77)   (1.7)   (1.46)   (1.37)   (1.45)   (1.33)   (1.92)   (2)   
D_SIZE   -0.011 *** -0.009 *** -0.014 *** -0.010 *** -0.013 *** -0.010 *** -0.015 *** -0.012 *** 
    (-4.55)   (-4.18)   (-7.53)   (-5.07)   (-7.32)   (-5.32)   (-7.41)   (-6.32)   
D_BTM   -0.014 *** -0.007 * -0.013 *** -0.008 * -0.010 ** -0.006   -0.010 *** -0.007 * 
    (-4.72)   (-1.7)   (-5.57)   (-1.8)   (-2.27)   (-1.27)   (-3.25)   (-1.75)   
D_VOLUME   -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.004 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** 
    (-2.32)   (-2.31)   (-2.87)   (-3.35)   (-2.83)   (-3.32)   (-3.14)   (-4.16)   
D_STDRET   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 * 0.000   
    (1.46)   (0.94)   (0.3)   (-0.09)   (0.57)   (0.21)   (1.8)   (1.34)   
D_ABS_ABNRET   0.004   0.002   0.009 * 0.008 ** 0.019 *** 0.016 *** 0.025 *** 0.023 *** 
    (1.17)   (0.89)   (1.92)   (2.13)   (2.6)   (2.87)   (2.96)   (3.93)   
D_PRICE   -0.002   -0.002   0.000   -0.001   -0.001   -0.002   -0.002   -0.003   
    (-1.22)   (-1.63)   (0.07)   (-1.25)   (-0.72)   (-1.25)   (-0.93)   (-1.51)   
D_ANALYST   -0.001   -0.001 * -0.002 * -0.002 ** -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   
    (-1.54)   (-1.83)   (-1.91)   (-2.27)   (-1.15)   (-1.54)   (-1.26)   (-1.49)   
D_INST_%   -0.002   -0.003   -0.010 *** -0.007 ** -0.010 ** -0.010 *** -0.013 *** -0.011 *** 
    (-0.46)   (-0.72)   (-3.55)   (-2.14)   (-2.48)   (-3.63)   (-2.62)   (-3.62)   
D_INST_N   0.000   0.003   0.003 *** 0.002 * 0.002 *** 0.002 * 0.003 *** 0.002 ** 
    (-0.27)   (1.17)   (2.88)   (1.93)   (3.05)   (1.84)   (3.29)   (2.19)   
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D_LAMBDA_MKT   0.143 *** 0.055 *** 0.110 ** 0.066 *** 0.100 *** 0.076 *** 0.107 *** 0.079 *** 
    (3.52)   (3.06)   (2.1)   (5.04)   (3.63)   (8.66)   (5.59)   (7.13)   
D_PST   -0.002 ** -0.002   -0.003 * -0.002   -0.005 ** -0.004 * -0.007 * -0.006 * 
    (-2.24)   (-1.57)   (-1.72)   (-1.42)   (-2.04)   (-1.65)   (-1.84)   (-1.89)   
D_SIZE * STK_DVF   0.001   -0.001   -0.001   -0.005   -0.003   -0.007 ** -0.002   -0.006   
    (0.33)   (-0.15)   (-0.14)   (-1.62)   (-0.9)   (-2.11)   (-0.54)   (-1.59)   
D_BTM  * STK_DVF   0.012 *** 0.003   0.012 ** 0.006   0.011   0.005   0.011   0.007   
    (2.93)   (0.72)   (2.22)   (1.18)   (1.17)   (0.59)   (1.26)   (1.06)   
D_VOLUME  * STK_DVF   -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** 
    (-4.18)   (-4.51)   (-3.17)   (-3.34)   (-2.73)   (-3.07)   (-2.74)   (-3.11)   
D_STDRET  * STK_DVF   0.000 *** 0.000 * 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 * 0.000   0.000   
    (-3.22)   (-1.76)   (0.83)   (1.42)   (0.73)   (1.79)   (0.18)   (1.04)   
D_ABS_ABNRET  * STK_DVF   0.002   0.003   0.002   0.004   0.008   0.011   0.018   0.021 ** 
    (0.48)   (1.25)   (0.42)   (0.82)   (0.83)   (1.39)   (1.57)   (2.22)   
D_PRICE  * STK_DVF   -0.003   -0.004   -0.004   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.001   
    (-1.04)   (-1.42)   (-1.62)   (-1.01)   (-1)   (-0.85)   (-0.77)   (-0.29)   
D_ANALYST  * STK_DVF   -0.001   -0.001   0.000   0.000   -0.001   -0.001   0.000   0.000   
    (-0.46)   (-0.56)   (-0.07)   (0)   (-0.88)   (-0.41)   (-0.29)   (0.06)   
D_INST_%  * STK_DVF   0.007   0.009   0.010 * 0.008   0.009   0.009 ** 0.015 ** 0.015 *** 
    (0.84)   (1.12)   (1.83)   (1.5)   (1.6)   (2.21)   (2.57)   (3.28)   
D_INST_N  * STK_DVF   -0.009 ** -0.012 ** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** 
    (-1.97)   (-2.52)   (-3.43)   (-3.09)   (-2.82)   (-2.61)   (-2.92)   (-2.74)   
D_LAMBDA_MKT  * STK_DVF   -0.087   0.004   -0.047   -0.002   -0.011   0.015   -0.005   0.024   
    (-1.63)   (0.11)   (-0.65)   (-0.04)   (-0.21)   (0.35)   (-0.1)   (0.49)   
D_PST  * STK_DVF   -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 ** -0.012 ** -0.014 ** -0.016 * -0.018 * 
    (-2.81)   (-2.61)   (-2.87)   (-2.52)   (-2.24)   (-2.35)   (-1.88)   (-1.93)   
R-sqr   0.190   0.192   0.282   0.286   0.370   0.374   0.446   0.450   
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of the change in the adverse selection components of Compustat firms on the change in the 
percentages of shares held by ETFs, with interaction terms with diversification dummies. I estimate pooled regressions of the firm sample and report coefficients and t-statistics calculated with two-way 
cluster robust errors (Gow et al. [2009]). D_Xs refer to the change of variables calculated over one to four quarters of pre- and post-periods surrounding quarters when an ETF is newly introduced. Let 
t=0 be the event quarter and X(t) denote a variable for a period that is t quarters before and after the event period. D_X is calculated as  ∑∑
−
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,where k=1,…,4. For firms that are 
included in new ETFs, ETF_DVF1 and ETF_DVF2 are weighted by the number of shares held by these ETFs. STK_DVF1 (STK_DVF2) is 0 if the value-weighted ETF_DVF1 (ETF_DVF2) for the 
firm-quarter is closer to 0, and 1 if it is closer to 1. All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Table 7: Regressions of ETF Lambda on Holding Stocks’ Lambdas 
   Dep. Var: ETF_LAMBDA 
 Pred. Sign ETF_DVF= 
 
H2-a H2-b ETF_DVF1 ETF_DVF2 ETF_DVF1 ETF_DVF2 
    1 2 3 4 
Intercept     0.138 *** 0.126 *** 0.144 *** 0.132 *** 
      (4.28)   (4.19)   (5.12)   (4.92)   
ETF_DVF - + -0.068 ** -0.058 * -0.125 *** -0.122 *** 
      (-2.03)   (-1.81)   (-3.18)   (-3.07)   
STK_LAMBDA     -0.076   -0.074           
      (-0.29)   (-0.29)           
STK_LAMBDA * ETF_DVF - + 0.781 * 0.867 **         
      (1.96)   (2.22)           
STK_ETF_%HLD             -0.363   -0.353   
              (-0.29)   (-0.29)   
STK_ETF_%HLD * ETF_DVF - +         3.735 * 4.148 ** 
              (1.96)   (2.22)   
ETF_SIZE     -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 *** 
      (-4.64)   (-4.5)   (-4.73)   (-4.56)   
ETF_VOLUME     -0.003   -0.002   -0.003 * -0.002   
      (-1.34)   (-1.17)   (-1.94)   (-1.53)   
ETF_STDRET     0.041 *** 0.040 *** 0.052   0.051   
      (4.37)   (4.39)   (1.23)   (1.23)   
ETF_ABS_ABNRET     0.124 ** 0.108 * 0.131 *** 0.116 *** 
      (2.08)   (1.87)   (3.31)   (2.95)   
ETF_PRICE     -0.009   -0.008   -0.009   -0.009   
      (-0.98)   (-1.06)   (-1.04)   (-1.15)   
ETF_INST_%     0.017   0.017   0.018   0.017   
      (1.49)   (1.46)   (1.61)   (1.58)   
ETF_INST_N     -0.003   -0.004 * -0.003   -0.003   
      (-1.09)   (-1.84)   (-0.8)   (-1.3)   
ETF_PST     -0.011   -0.014   -0.011   -0.014   
      (-0.69)   (-0.91)   (-0.69)   (-0.91)   
ETF_LAMBDA_MKT     0.420 *** 0.459 *** 0.408 *** 0.447 *** 
     (6)   (6.37)   (6.67)   (6.93)   
ETF_SIZE * ETF_DVF     0.007 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 
      (3.62)   (3.45)   (3.58)   (3.32)   
ETF_VOLUME * ETF_DVF     0.002   0.001   0.005 ** 0.005 ** 
      (0.84)   (0.65)   (2.07)   (2.09)   
ETF_STDRET * ETF_DVF     -0.024   -0.027   -0.141 * -0.156 ** 
      (-1.18)   (-1.49)   (-1.82)   (-2.12)   
ETF_ABS_ABNRET * ETF_DVF     -0.180 ** -0.179 ** -0.259 ** -0.266 *** 
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      (-2.03)   (-2.32)   (-2.59)   (-3.1)   
ETF_PRICE * ETF_DVF     0.003   0.002   0.005   0.004   
      (0.3)   (0.26)   (0.48)   (0.49)   
ETF_INST_% * ETF_DVF     -0.010   -0.011   -0.013   -0.015   
      (-0.76)   (-0.93)   (-1.03)   (-1.28)   
ETF_INST_N * ETF_DVF     -0.003   -0.002   -0.006   -0.005 * 
      (-1.1)   (-1.07)   (-1.58)   (-1.75)   
ETF_PST * ETF_DVF     -0.006   0.004   -0.006   0.004   
      (-0.34)   (0.2)   (-0.33)   (0.21)   
ETF_LAMBDA_MKT * 
ETF_DVF     0.044   -0.025   0.172   0.116   
     (0.47)   (-0.29)   (1.4)   (1.05)   
R-sqr     0.185   0.185   0.182   0.182   
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of ETF-level 
adverse selection costs on the value-weighted averages of holding stock lambdas and other determinants of the 
ETF-level lambdas. I estimate pooled 2-stage least squares regressions of the ETFs sample. I use the idiosyncratic 
volatility of firm returns as an instrument in the first stage and estimate the predictive value of STK_LAMBDA. I 
report the second stage coefficients and t-statistics calculated with two-way cluster robust errors (Gow et al. 
[2009]). ETF_LAMBDA (in %) is the adverse selection component (λ) of ETF bid-ask spreads estimated per 
month with the method by Madhavan et al. [1997] modified by Armstrong et al. [2009]. Observations with 
negative values or larger than 100(%) of ETF_LAMBDA are excluded from the sample. STK_LAMBDA is the 
value-weighted average of holding stocks’ lambdas of ETFs.  ETF_SIZE the log of one plus ETF market value, 
calculated with the sum of stocks’ daily market values (CRSP prc * shrout). ETF_VOLUME it the turnover of an 
ETF calculated as the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP trading volume divided by one plus the 
number of shares outstanding. ETF_STDRET is the annualized time-series standard deviation of daily returns, 
calculated each quarter. ETF_ABS_ABNRET is the absolute abnormal cumulative returns in each quarter. 
ETF_PRICE is the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP prices of an ETF. ETF_INST_% is the 
quarterly % of institutional ownership of an ETF from Thomson Financial Spectrum. ETF_INST_N is the log of 
one plus the quarterly number of institutional owners of an ETF from Thomson Financial Spectrum. STK_IDIO 
is the value-weighted average of holding stocks’ idiosyncratic volatilities. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as 
the quarterly standard deviation of residuals of daily cross-sectional Fama-French 3-factor regressions. At least 15 
daily observations are required to calculate the standard deviation for each quarter. ETF_DVF1 is 0 if an ETF is a 
sector ETF, and 1 otherwise. ETF_DVF2 is 0(1) if an ETF is ranked in the lower (higher) 50% of the factor score, 
calculated with the diversification score, the number of holding stocks, and the average weights of holding stocks. 
The diversification score is 0 if an ETF is a sector ETF, 1 if an ETF duplicates an index based on size and growth, 
2 if an ETF duplicates an index based either on size or growth, and 3 if an ETF duplicates a broad market index. 
ETF_PST is the % of small trades, calculated with intraday trade data of ETFs. ETF_LAMBDA_MKT is the 
average of ETF_LAMBDA, calculated with all sample ETFs. All variables are winsorized at 1%. All variables 
are winsorized at 1%. 
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Table 8: Regressions of % of Small Trades 
Panel A: Regressions of PST on ETF_%HLD 
 
Pred. 
Sign Dep. Var: PST 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept   1.555 *** 1.581 *** 1.419 *** 1.425 *** 1.425 *** 1.587 *** 
    (17.37)   (15.44)   (16.63)   (14.45)   (14.44)   (16.18)   
ETF_%HLD -     1.935 ***     2.402 *** 2.402 ***     
        (12.08)       (14.24)   (14.2)       
MFID_%HLD -         -5.525 *** -6.649 *** -6.650 ***     
            (-11.2)   (-15.3)   (-15.21)       
ID_%HLD -                     0.862 *** 
                        (5.16)   
MFAM_%HLD -                 0.002   -0.029   
                    (0.07)   (-1.06)   
SIZE + -0.044 *** -0.043 *** -0.035 *** -0.032 *** -0.032 *** -0.045 *** 
    (-17.26)   (-16.54)   (-16.42)   (-14.56)   (-14.56)   (-17.85)   
BTM - -0.035 *** -0.032 *** -0.032 *** -0.027 *** -0.027 *** -0.035 *** 
    (-6.18)   (-5.8)   (-5.56)   (-4.96)   (-4.78)   (-6.02)   
VOLUME + 0.010 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.009 *** 
    (6.09)   (5.45)   (4.9)   (3.64)   (3.59)   (6.16)   
STDRET - 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 
    (2.91)   (3.85)   (3.22)   (4.58)   (4.57)   (3.37)   
ABS_ABNRET - -0.082 *** -0.080 *** -0.084 *** -0.081 *** -0.081 *** -0.081 *** 
    (-8.16)   (-9)   (-8.05)   (-9.06)   (-9.07)   (-8.54)   
PRICE - -0.163 *** -0.166 *** -0.167 *** -0.173 *** -0.173 *** -0.163 *** 
    (-32.51)   (-35.39)   (-31.94)   (-35.4)   (-35.32)   (-33.87)   
ANALYST + 0.009 ** 0.009 ** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 0.009 ** 
    (2.65)   (2.55)   (3.37)   (3.44)   (3.57)   (2.73)   
INST_% - 0.059 *** 0.023 ** 0.066 *** 0.022 ** 0.021 ** 0.048 *** 
    (5.61)   (2.27)   (6.62)   (2.44)   (2.33)   (4.74)   
INST_N + 0.001   -0.002   0.006 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** -0.002   
    (0.25)   (-0.91)   (2.59)   (2.06)   (2.09)   (-0.66)   
PST_MKT + 0.326 *** 0.242 * 0.339 *** 0.238 * 0.238 * 0.286 ** 
    (3.18)   (1.98)   (3.54)   (2.01)   (2.01)   (2.49)   
R-sqr   0.630   0.638   0.640   0.653   0.653   0.632   
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of the percentages of small 
trades on the percentages of shares held by ETFs. I estimate pooled regressions of the firm sample and report coefficients and t-
statistics calculated with two-way cluster robust errors (Gow et al. [2009]). PST is the % of small trades (defined as trades smaller 
than $5,000), calculated with the TAQ intraday trade dataset. PST is calculated daily and averaged by quarter. ETF_%HLD is 
the percentage of shares held by any of the U.S. equity ETFs, calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). MFID_%HLD is the 
percentage of shares held by U.S. equity index mutual funds, calculated with Thomson holdings data (S12). MFAM_%HLD is 
the percentage of shares held by actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. All non-ETF, non-index, U.S. equity mutual funds in 
Thomson holdings data (S12) are categorized as actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. ETF_%HLD, MFID_%HLD, and 
MFAM_%HLD are calculated daily and averaged by quarter. SIZE is the log of one plus market value (CRSP prc * shrout). 
BTM is the book-to-market assets ratio calculated as (Compustat ATQ/(ATQ -Compustat CEQQ + Market Value))) on the quarter 
end date. VOLUME is the turnover calculated as the log of one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP trading volume divided 
by one plus the number of shares outstanding. STDRET is the annualized time-series standard deviation of daily returns (CRSP 
ret), calculated each quarter. ABS_ABNRET is the absolute abnormal cumulative returns in each quarter. PRICE is the log of 
one plus the quarterly average of daily CRSP prices. ANALYST is the log of one plus the quarterly average number of analysts 
following counted from I/B/E/S. INST_% is the quarterly % of institutional ownership from Thomson Financial Spectrum. 
INST_N is the log of one plus the quarterly number of institutional owners from Thomson Financial Spectrum. PST_MKT is the 
average PST of all stocks in the sample. All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Panel B: Regression of D_PST on D_ETF_%HLD 
 
Pred. 
Sign Dep. Var: PST 
   1 QTR 2 QTR 3 QTR 4 QTR 
   1 2 3 4 
Intercept   0.012 *** 0.021 *** 0.025 *** 0.028 *** 
    (3.11)   (3.72)   (3.12)   (3.15)   
D_ETF_%HLD - -0.810 * -1.071 ** -0.845 * -0.509   
    (-1.85)   (-2.5)   (-1.88)   (-1.08)   
D_SIZE + 0.076 *** 0.056 *** 0.041 ** 0.031 ** 
    (4.02)   (2.94)   (2.45)   (2)   
D_BTM - -0.087 *** -0.081 *** -0.064 *** -0.060 *** 
    (-3.8)   (-3.34)   (-3.05)   (-3.21)   
D_VOLUME + -0.020 *** -0.005   0.004   0.012   
    (-2.84)   (-0.64)   (0.44)   (1.19)   
D_STDRET - 0.000   0.001 * 0.001   0.000   
    (1.63)   (1.73)   (1.06)   (0.4)   
D_ABS_ABNRET - -0.032 *** -0.076 *** -0.122 *** -0.173 *** 
    (-4.05)   (-3.92)   (-5.79)   (-8.06)   
D_PRICE - -0.408 *** -0.378 *** -0.354 *** -0.342 *** 
    (-15.14)   (-14.74)   (-14.21)   (-14.29)   
D_ANALYST + 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.014 ** 0.012 ** 
    (4.03)   (2.78)   (2.57)   (2.45)   
D_INST_% - 0.061 ** 0.094 *** 0.097 *** 0.103 *** 
    (2.51)   (3.04)   (3.86)   (4.42)   
D_INST_N + 0.017 * 0.001   -0.006   -0.009   
    (1.74)   (0.1)   (-0.66)   (-0.98)   
D_PST_MKT + 0.262 * 0.330 * 0.503 ** 0.555 *** 
    (1.75)   (1.81)   (2.45)   (3.33)   
R-sqr   0.310   0.342   0.375   0.417   
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of 
the change in the percentages of small trades on the change in the percentages of those firms’ shares that 
are held by ETFs. I estimate pooled regressions of the firm sample and report coefficients and t-statistics 
calculated with two-way cluster robust errors (Gow et al. [2009]). D_Xs refer to the change of variables 
calculated over one to four quarters of pre- and post-periods surrounding quarters when an ETF is newly 
introduced. Let t=0 be the event quarter and X(t) denote a variable for a period that is t quarters before 
and after the event period. D_X is calculated as  ∑∑
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,where k=1,…,4. All variables 
are winsorized at 1%. 
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Panel C: Regressions of D_PST on diversification 
  Dep. Var: D_PST 
  1 QTR 2 QTR 3 QTR 4QTR 
   STK_DVF= 
 
Pred. 
Sign STK_DVF1 STK_DVF2 STK_DVF1 STK_DVF2 STK_DVF1 STK_DVF2 STK_DVF1 STK_DVF2 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intercept   0.011   0.013 * 0.027 ** 0.019 *** 0.033 ** 0.023 ** 0.039 ** 0.028 *** 
    (1.26)   (1.91)   (2.34)   (2.72)   (2.13)   (2.5)   (2.49)   (3.12)   
STK_DVF   0.001   0.000   -0.006   0.003   -0.008   0.003   -0.011   0.001   
    (0.06)   (-0.04)   (-0.53)   (0.39)   (-0.49)   (0.29)   (-0.63)   (0.06)   
D_ETF_%HLD   -0.113   -0.035   -0.589 * -0.376 * -0.711 ** -0.418 * -0.681 * -0.483 ** 
    (-0.38)   (-0.16)   (-1.91)   (-1.78)   (-2.08)   (-1.78)   (-1.92)   (-2.13)   
D_ETF_%HLD* STK_DVF - -0.939   -1.164 ** -0.695   -1.068 * -0.227   -0.661   0.168   -0.127   
    (-1.62)   (-2.47)   (-1.39)   (-1.88)   (-0.38)   (-0.98)   (0.3)   (-0.2)   
D_SIZE   0.084 ** 0.057 * 0.064 ** 0.057 ** 0.053 * 0.045 * 0.046 * 0.033   
    (2.28)   (1.92)   (2.11)   (2.5)   (1.88)   (1.93)   (1.82)   (1.47)   
D_BTM   0.001   -0.003   0.032   0.012   0.055   0.026   0.066   0.019   
    (0.01)   (-0.03)   (0.34)   (0.14)   (0.58)   (0.33)   (0.97)   (0.31)   
D_VOLUME   -0.011   -0.012   -0.012   -0.006   0.009   0.009   0.025 ** 0.022   
    (-0.98)   (-1.2)   (-1.37)   (-0.66)   (0.7)   (0.75)   (2.12)   (1.62)   
D_STDRET   0.000   0.000   -0.001   0.000   0.000   0.000   -0.002   -0.001   
    (0.28)   (0.48)   (-0.53)   (-0.34)   (0.15)   (0.07)   (-0.87)   (-0.57)   
D_ABS_ABNRET   0.003   -0.021   -0.014   -0.033   -0.103 *** -0.116 *** -0.131 *** -0.157 *** 
    (0.08)   (-0.81)   (-0.35)   (-0.83)   (-4.44)   (-3.29)   (-2.77)   (-4.49)   
D_PRICE   -0.436 *** -0.424 *** -0.412 *** -0.410 *** -0.394 *** -0.386 *** -0.384 *** -0.375 *** 
    (-15.1)   (-16.25)   (-15.71)   (-16.38)   (-14.61)   (-15.98)   (-15.4)   (-16.37)   
D_ANALYST   0.022 * 0.026 *** 0.026 ** 0.025 ** 0.028 ** 0.028 *** 0.033 *** 0.033 *** 
    (1.65)   (2.69)   (2.16)   (2.06)   (2.52)   (2.95)   (2.85)   (3.5)   
D_INST_%   0.116 ** 0.071 * 0.248 *** 0.182 *** 0.233 *** 0.171 *** 0.228 *** 0.178 *** 
    (2.07)   (1.69)   (5.18)   (4.1)   (5.05)   (3.68)   (4.34)   (2.95)   
D_INST_N   -0.077 *** -0.059 *** -0.060 *** -0.055 *** -0.044 *** -0.046 *** -0.045 *** -0.048 *** 
    (-3.66)   (-2.63)   (-4.33)   (-3.32)   (-2.75)   (-3.51)   (-2.76)   (-3.44)   
D_PST_MKT   0.209   0.183 ** 0.089   0.376 *** 0.193   0.512 *** 0.185   0.517 *** 
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    (1.57)   (2.4)   (0.48)   (3.29)   (0.82)   (3.53)   (0.93)   (3.45)   
D_SIZE * STK_DVF   -0.011   0.023   -0.010   -0.001   -0.014   -0.005   -0.016   -0.002   
    (-0.24)   (0.59)   (-0.28)   (-0.02)   (-0.43)   (-0.16)   (-0.56)   (-0.06)   
D_BTM  * STK_DVF   -0.095   -0.091   -0.123   -0.100   -0.132   -0.101   -0.139 * -0.089   
    (-0.84)   (-1.03)   (-1.22)   (-1.14)   (-1.27)   (-1.15)   (-1.85)   (-1.35)   
D_VOLUME  * STK_DVF   -0.011   -0.010   0.006   -0.001   -0.007   -0.007   -0.017   -0.015   
    (-1.05)   (-0.92)   (0.83)   (-0.12)   (-0.55)   (-0.56)   (-1.46)   (-1.01)   
D_STDRET  * STK_DVF   0.000   0.000   0.002 * 0.002 ** 0.001   0.001   0.002   0.001   
    (0.17)   (-0.01)   (1.87)   (2.44)   (0.31)   (0.61)   (0.98)   (0.82)   
D_ABS_ABNRET  * 
STK_DVF   -0.038   -0.012   -0.066   -0.044   -0.019   -0.003   -0.043   -0.013   
    (-1.08)   (-0.47)   (-1.61)   (-1.07)   (-0.54)   (-0.07)   (-0.74)   (-0.29)   
D_PRICE  * STK_DVF   0.034   0.022   0.040   0.040   0.047 * 0.041   0.049 * 0.041   
    (0.97)   (0.72)   (1.39)   (1.41)   (1.7)   (1.45)   (1.87)   (1.51)   
D_ANALYST  * STK_DVF   -0.011   -0.015   -0.015   -0.015   -0.015   -0.015 * -0.022 ** -0.023 *** 
    (-0.78)   (-1.62)   (-1.26)   (-1.17)   (-1.42)   (-1.73)   (-2.06)   (-2.86)   
D_INST_%  * STK_DVF   -0.060   -0.011   -0.167 *** -0.101 ** -0.151 *** -0.086 * -0.139 *** -0.088   
    (-0.91)   (-0.21)   (-2.73)   (-2.06)   (-3.18)   (-1.83)   (-2.65)   (-1.4)   
D_INST_N  * STK_DVF   0.104 *** 0.085 *** 0.067 *** 0.064 *** 0.042 ** 0.045 *** 0.040 ** 0.044 *** 
   (5.83)   (3.59)   (3.59)   (3.6)   (2.21)   (3.11)   (2.06)   (2.81)   
D_PST_MKT  * STK_DVF   0.064   0.094   0.259   -0.059   0.333   -0.015   0.403 * 0.048   
    (0.33)   (0.6)   (1.12)   (-0.28)   (1.16)   (-0.07)   (1.66)   (0.25)   
R-sqr   0.313   0.314   0.345   0.346   0.378   0.379   0.420   0.421   
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. This table provides regressions of the change in the percentages of small trades on the change 
in the percentages of shares held by ETFs, with interaction terms with diversification dummies. I estimate pooled regressions of the firm sample and report 
coefficients and t-statistics calculated with two-way cluster robust errors (Gow et al. [2009]). D_Xs refer to the change of variables calculated over one to four quarters of pre- 
and post-periods surrounding quarters when an ETF is newly introduced. Let t=0 be the event quarter and X(t) denote a variable for a period that is t quarters before and after the 
event period. D_X is calculated as  ∑∑
−
−==
−
1
1
)(1)(1
kt
k
t
tX
k
tX
k
,where k=1,…,4. For firms that are included in new ETFs, ETF_DVF1 and ETF_DVF2 are weighted by the number 
of shares held by these ETFs. STK_DVF1 (STK_DVF2) is 0 if the value-weighted ETF_DVF1 (ETF_DVF2) for the firm-quarter is closer to 0, and 1 if it is closer to 1. All 
variables are winsorized at 1%. 
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Figure 1. The Number of Sample ETFs
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This figure presents the number of diversified ETFs (ETF_DVF1=1) and the number of sector ETFs (ETF_DVF0) in each quarter. 
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Figure 2. The Total Market Value of Sample ETFs
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This figure presents the market value (in $million) of diversified ETFs (ETF_DVF1=1) and the market value (in $million) of sector ETFs (ETF_DVF1=0) in each 
quarter. 
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Figure 3. The Percentage of Firm Shares Held by ETFs (ETF_%HLD )
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This figure presents the average of ETF_%HLD calculated with diversified ETFs (ETF_DVF1=1) and the average of ETF_%HLD calculated with diversified ETFs 
sector ETFs (ETF_DVF1=0) in each quarter. 
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Figure 4. LAMBDA s of Firms Held/Not Held by ETFs
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This figure presents the average LAMBDA of firms that are not held by any ETF (ETF_%HLD=0) and the average LAMBDA of firms that are held by ETFs 
(ETF_%HLD>0)  in each quarter. 
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Figure 5. LAMBDA s of Firms Included/Not Included in New ETFs 
Prior to the Events of New ETF Inception
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This figure presents the average PRE_LAMBDA of firm-quarter observations that are not in the event study sample and the average PRE_LAMBDA of firm-quarter 
observations that in the event study sample (due to inclusion in the newly introduced ETFs). PRE_LAMBDA is LAMBDA, one quarter prior to the event quarter, 
calculated as ∑
−
−=
1
)(1
kt
tLAMBDA
k
, where k=1. PRE_LAMBDAs calculated with k=2,…4 yield similar figures.  
 
 
 
